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ABSTRACT 
In this report, the inherent tension between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation is 
addressed with a focus on trade in services. Therefore, this report examines in detail what is 
meant by the term ‘(constraints on) regulatory autonomy’ in trade law literature and develops 
five dimensions of the term: (i) endogenous and exogenous regulatory autonomy, (ii) regulatory 
autonomy related to the interest which a measure aims to advance, (iii) macro level constraints 
stemming from trade agreements, (iv) regulatory autonomy concerns resulting from the three 
steps of establishing a trade law violation, and (v) constraints related to the nature of the 
obligation. Subsequently, this report addresses how, in the case of the European Union, GATS’ 
unconditional obligations constrain regulatory autonomy. Aside from the Most-Favoured-Nation 
obligation, we address a series of obligations related to transparency. Our preliminary 
conclusions reflect the partial nature of this report, but already highlight that these unconditional 
obligations contain a few possibly problematic constraints on regulatory autonomy. 
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general obligations in GATS on regulatory autonomy in the EU and builds specifically on the first and third reports of 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains two types of obligations.2 On the 
one hand, conditional obligations only apply to sectors for which specific commitments have 
been scheduled. 3  On the other hand, some unconditional obligations apply to all services 
covered by GATS. With the exception of the list of Exemptions to the Most-Favoured-Nation 
(MFN) treatment obligation—and in contrast to the conditional obligations, which apply only to 
sectors in which specific commitments have been scheduled—these obligations cannot be 
shaped by the Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Hence, from the perspective 
of a regulator, it is crucial to understand the exact meaning of the obligations resting upon them 
for all measures which fall within the wide scope of GATS.4 More specifically, although the well-
known flexibility of GATS is least apparent in the case of unconditional obligations, this 
contribution addresses the impact on the domestic regulatory autonomy of the European Union 
(EU). 
 
indicated in the third report of this research track, 5  the GATS preamble states that the 
achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalisation of trade in services is desired to 
promote ‘the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis’. However, the 
subsequent paragraph of the preamble recognises the right of WTO Members to regulate and to 
introduce new regulation to meet national policy objectives. Moreover, although expanding trade 
in services and promoting growth can be considered to be the main goals of GATS, the 
preamble foresees the possible conflict between these goals and regulatory autonomy. The 
preamble’s hybrid character illustrates that a balance between trade liberalisation and regulatory 
autonomy needs to be struck. This balance in the unconditional obligations in GATS, in the case 
of unconditional obligations, is what is under scrutiny in this report. Therefore, three aspects 
must be addressed: (i) the scope of the obligation, (ii) its substantive content, and (iii) any 
relevant exceptions to the obligation. The scope of GATS obligations has been addressed in a 
previous report of the Policy Research Centre,6  but is summarised here if necessary. The 
substantive content of the unconditional obligations is the focus of this contribution. The 
exceptions to the obligations will be addressed in a future report, although this report covers 
those exceptions which only or mostly apply to one of the obligations under scrutiny here, such 
as the lists of MFN Exemptions. 
                                               
2
 Rudolf Adlung, ‘Public Services and the GATS’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 455, 459. Adlung 
devises three categories: (i) unconditional general obligations; (ii) conditional general obligations, which apply only to 
sectors in which specific commitments have been undertaken; and (iii) specific commitments, taking into account 
scheduled limitations. However, for the purpose of this report, it is sufficient to distinguish between unconditional 
obligations on the one hand, and conditional obligations on the other. 
3
 Conditional obligations contain both general obligations (e.g. Article VI GATS) and specific commitments (e.g. 
Article XVII GATS). 
4
 For a discussion of the scope of GATS, see Bregt Natens and Jan Wouters, The Scope of GATS and of its 
Obligations (Policy Research Centre Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development Cooperation 
Research Paper 6, 2013). 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 See supra note 4. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we elaborately set out what it is that is meant by 
the terms ‘trade liberalisation’ and ‘regulatory autonomy’ and how the inherent tension between 
regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation is the crux of international trade law. We end this 
section by explaining why the EU should be the case study for our analysis. Second, we 
address how regulatory autonomy is constrained by GATS’ unconditional obligations, in the 
case of the EU. More specifically, we address two ‘categories’ of unconditional obligations: the 
MFN obligation, and unconditional obligations related to transparency. Lastly, we draw some 
preliminary conclusions. 
 
It should be stressed that this report is part of a larger work in process, in which all other GATS 
obligations and exceptions will be addressed in a similar way. In a subsequent step, the same 
will be done for the services provisions of selected EU RTAs.  
 
THE TENSION BETWEEN REGULATORY AUTONOMY AND TRADE LIBERALISATION 
 
Since its creation in 1947, the GATT has exemplified the multilateral trading system. The 
regulatory philosophy of GATT was based on the principle of non-discrimination, in two 
emanations. First, the national treatment obligation requires Members to treat domestic and 
foreign like products similarly. Second, through the MFN obligation, the non-discrimination 
principle was effectively multilateralised: a WTO Member could no longer discriminate through 
the use of diverse tariffs for different Members. Hence, as long as it is not discriminatory, the 
content of a measure is not assessed by non-discrimination obligations. However, since the 
establishment of the WTO, the agenda of the multilateral trading system broadened 
substantially, now focusing on the establishment of a global marketplace aside from liberalising 
trade through non-discrimination.7 As a result of the altered approach of the international trading 
system, the purpose of trade liberalisation, which was first mostly focused on removing 
discriminatory barriers to trade, now also actively targets barriers to market access.8 
 
1. Defining trade liberalisation 
 
As a result of this altered approach, the meaning of the term ‘trade liberalisation’ can be 
somewhat obfuscated. Generally speaking, trade liberalisation can be defined as:  
                                               
7
 Veijo Heiskanen, ‘The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law’ (2004) 38 Journal of World Trade 1, 2-5 
and 13-18. 
8
 See, explicitly regarding regulatory autonomy, Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, ‘Trade Liberalization and 
Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics’ (1998) 6 European Journal of Law 
and Economics 5; Robert Howse, ‘Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade 
Organization’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2329, 2329; Michael Ming Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under 
the TBT Agreement: From Non-discrimination to Harmonization’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 269, 
271; Michael Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or 
Reality?’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1077, 1077-1078; Emily Reid, ‘Regulatory Autonomy in the 
EU and WTO: Defining and Defending Its Limits’ (2010) 44 Journal of World Trade 877, 900-901. 
7 
 
‘a process aimed at reducing tariffs and quotas as between nations, and supported 
by MFN and national treatment obligations.’9 
 
MFN and national treatment obligations are the core non-discrimination obligations of GATS. 
However, as noted, the focus on creating a global marketplace also requires the reduction of 
obstacles to trade that result from domestic regulatory heterogeneity, commonly referred to as 
increased ‘market access’. 
This leads to market integration, which can be understood as: 
‘a process which, in addition to trade liberalisation, aims at the abolition of all 
obstacles, both at and behind the border, to freedom of movement for all factors—
including persons, services and capital—by introducing convergence and/or 
harmonisation of domestic economic, monetary and social regulatory policies.'10 
 
However, trade liberalisation and market integration are not clearly demarcated phases in 
economic integration but sit on a continuum. 11  It should, however, be noted that the term 
‘market access’ has a more specific meaning in the context of trade in services: Article XVI 
GATS constrains the meaning of the term to a closed list of six types of restrictions to market 
access.12 Moreover, GATS contains both non-discrimination obligations and obligations related 
to market access sensu lato as defined above. In this report, the term ‘market access’ will be 
used sensu stricto, as in Article XVI GATS. 
                                               
9
 Gaëtan Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement: Adjudicating the Boundaries of Regulatory 
Autonomy (Hart 2002) 5 5. 
10
 Ibid 5-6. 
11
 Ibid 1-2. Verhoosel addresses this tension between trade liberalisation sensu stricto and market integration. The 
author argues that ‘national treatment is the gatekeeper on the misty bridge between trade liberalisation and deep 
market integration.’ 
12
 Article XVI:2 GATS reads: 
‘In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a Member 
shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire 
territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as: 
 (a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, 
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test; 
 (b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical 
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; 
 (c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service 
output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the 
requirement of an economic needs test;9 
 (d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular 
service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, and 
directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the form of numerical quotas or 
the requirement of an economic needs test; 
 (e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through 
which a service supplier may supply a service; and 
 (f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit 
on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.’ 
8 
 
Aside from the terminological confusion related to the term market access in GATS, for our 
purposes, it is also unnecessary to differentiate between non-discrimination obligations and 
market access or market integration obligations in general. Consequently, this report uses ‘trade 
liberalisation’ in an extensive meaning, encompassing all obligations arising from the 
international regulation of trade in services. More precisely, trade liberalisation could be defined 
as ‘a process introducing greater market openness and a competitive market environment.’13 It 
does so through legally binding obligations and commitments, or through non-binding 
agreements. In the context of constraints on regulatory autonomy, the former are, of course, the 
relevant ones. 
 
Lastly, it should also be noted that liberalisation, whether used in a narrow or in a wide 
understanding, is not equal to deregulation, which literally indicates removing or reducing 
regulation. However, conforming to liberalisation obligations and commitments does not 
necessarily require deregulation,14 but may also require reregulation. In that sense, liberalisation 
and regulation—defined infra—can be mutually reinforcing in the case of restrictive business 
practices hampering liberalisation.15  This combination of deregulation and reregulation, which 
aims at improving the efficiency of policies related to market entry, production method, product 
attributes and supplier-customer transactions, is often referred to as regulatory reform. 16 In 
conclusion, even our wide notion of liberalisation is but one element of profound regulatory 
reforms.17 
 
2. A terminological clarification on regulatory autonomy 
 
The concept ‘regulatory autonomy’ goes by many monikers, including domestic regulatory 
autonomy, national regulatory autonomy, policy autonomy, unconstrained policy choice, juridical 
space, trade policy space, policy space, political space, regulatory room for manoeuvre, 
regulatory jurisdictional allocation, manoeuvring space, regulatory space, domestic sovereignty, 
domestic political sovereignty and policy autonomy, and sovereignty. In the context of 
international trade—and with the exception of sovereignty, of which regulatory autonomy is ‘part 
and parcel’—,18 these terms have been used in similar ways and to indicate parts of the same 
                                               
13
 Markus Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services (Kluwer Law International 2003) 5. 
14
 Aaditya Mattoo and Pierre Sauvé, ‘Domestic Regulation & Trade in Services: Key Issues’ in Aaditya Mattoo and 
Pierre Sauvé (eds), Domestic Regulation & Service Trade Liberalization (World Bank & Oxford University Press 
2003) 1-2; Panagiotis Delimatsis, International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations: Necessity, 
Transparency and Regulatory Diversity (Oxford University Press 2008) 162. 
15
 Krajewski 5 and 8. 
16
 Robert G Noll, ‘Regulatory Reform as International Policy’ in OECD (ed), Regulatory Reform and International 
Market Openness (OECD 1996) 31. 
17
 Krajewski 36-39. Other important factors are technological change, a shift in the use and better appreciation of 
regulatory instruments, and increased integration and internationalisation of the global economy. On regulatory 
reform, see OECD (ed) Regulatory Reform and International Market Openness (OECD 1996). 
18
 Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-discrimination to Harmonization’ 273 
and Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’ (2011) 14 Journal of 
International Economic Law 639, 641. Also see John H Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals 
of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2006), especially pages 57-78 and 214-217. Jackson argues that 
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concept. In this report, the term regulatory autonomy will be used exclusively. This choice can 
be motivated based on two bases. First, in the choice between autonomy, space, room for 
manoeuvre and sovereignty, it is clear that in the literature autonomy is most used. Key 
contributions dedicated specifically to this issue have used the term autonomy.19 Second, there 
is the choice between domestic regulatory autonomy, national regulatory autonomy, or 
regulatory autonomy. The addition of the prefix ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ has the benefit of 
indicating that international or ‘transnational regulatory space’ is not meant,20 but rather that of 
regulatory autonomy at the level of the sovereign state. However, considering the limited 
attention in legal scholarship to such autonomy, it is warranted to assess the added value of 
such a prefix.  
 
In the context of this and subsequent reports, adding one of either prefixes may add confusion 
rather than clarity. In the context of GATS, domestic regulation has a distinct meaning (as does 
market access, see infra). Disciplined by Article VI GATS, in that context, the term refers partly 
to all measures of general application affecting trade in services and administrative decisions 
affecting trade in services, but also partly to qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements. Additionally, and as will be addressed infra, the 
scope of Article VI is unclear. Hence, it does not appear useful to use the term domestic 
regulatory autonomy. In the case of national regulatory autonomy, confusion may arise in the 
specific context of the EU. Considering the broad scope of regulation which may impact 
international trade in services and the broad scope of GATS, the regulatory autonomy of the 
European legislative branch, the national legislators at the Member State level as well as 
subnational entities with legislative powers may be curbed by international obligations on trade 
in services. Hence, national regulatory autonomy may be interpreted as referring only to 
constraints on the regulatory autonomy of the national legislator, while this report will assess the 
constraints on the regulatory autonomy of the competent legislator in a multilevel EU context. 
Hence, it appears justified to use the term regulatory autonomy as such. Next, the concept must 
be defined. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
sovereignty as practically used today in policy debates most of the time refers to allocation of power, that is 
government decision-making power. Allocation of power has a horizontal (for example, within a state) and vertical (for 
example, between the WTO and a Member) dimension, and a third dimension (for example, economic, government, 
non-government) which compete for power. It is the vertical dimension which is most relevant for our purposes.  
19
 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, ‘Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dillema and a 
Possible Resolution’ (1998) 1 Journal of International Economic Law 303; Krajewski – of which the subtitle reads ‘The 
Legal Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy; Andrew 
Lang, ‘The GATS and Regulatory Autonomy: a Case Study of Social Regulation of the Water Industry’ (2004) 7 
Journal of International Economic Law 801; Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO 
Regime’. 
20
 See Steven Bernstein and Erin Hannah, ‘Non State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the 
Need for Regulatory Space’ (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 575. The authors argue that there 
should be transnational regulatory space for social and environmental standard setting in the global marketplace. 
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3. Constructing an encompassing concept of regulatory autonomy through the multiple 
dimensions of constraints on regulatory autonomy 
 
3.1 Defining regulatory autonomy 
 
First, regulatory autonomy addresses regulatory measures or regulation. In the legal sense, and 
in the European tradition, regulation may be understood as rulemaking which aims to correct 
market failures, which pursues distributional goals, or which seeks to advance other social or 
economic policy objectives.21 In essence, they differ from country to country as they reflect local 
preferences and circumstances. 22  Hence, regulatory measures are ‘measures that a 
government characterizes as an exercise of its authority to regulate its domestic affairs.’23 In its 
widest sense, regulation is  
‘the process of influencing, controlling and guiding economic or other private 
activities with impacts on others through various governmental policies and 
measures.’24 
 
Practically, regulation may consist of laws, subsidiary rules issued by a government or a body 
with delegated powers, and formal and informal orders and generally are either economic 
regulations, social regulations, administrative regulations or a combination thereof.25  
Moreover, regulation ‘requires space and flexibility to test and discover’ regulatory measures to 
attain various regulatory goals.26 Because of the intangible and invisible nature of services, 
governments tend to heavily regulate services and these regulations often intrude on socially 
sensitive issues.27 Hence, the regulation of services by a domestic regulator contains a, in 
comparison to goods, wide array of behind-the-border measures with sensitive subjects and 
goals. However, if regulation disadvantages foreign competitors in a manner which is 
unnecessary for the attainment of a genuine, non-protectionist regulatory objective, there is 
regulatory protectionism.28 
 
Second, in general, regulatory autonomy is the autonomy to regulate. The regulator should be 
competent to enact regulation and, if this is the focus of our approach to regulatory autonomy, 
this competence should not be restricted. In the context of international trade in services, the 
relevant restrictions are those imposed on regulators by international trade law. 
                                               
21
 Krajewski 2. Also see pages 11-21 for an overview of theories on why governments regulate. 
22
 Freider Roessler, ‘Increasing Market Access Under Regulatory Heterogeneity: The Strategies of the World Trade 
Organisation’ in OECD (ed), Regulatory Reform and International Market Openness (OECD 1996) 117. 
23
 Robert E Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an "Aim and Effects" Test’ (1998) 
32 The International Lawyer 619; Delimatsis 91. 
24
 Krajewski 4. 
25
 Delimatsis 91. 
26
 Krajewski 40. 
27
 Delimatsis 37-38. See more generally, pages 37-83 on barriers to trade in services. 
28
 Alan O Sykes, ‘Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1, 3. 
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Combining these two elements, it becomes clear that the concept of regulatory autonomy is 
linked to the balance between on the one hand domestic preferences reflecting domestic needs 
fulfilling domestic regulatory purposes, and on the other hand the adverse trade effects of such 
regulations. As noted, market failures in a wide sense—i.e. including non-economic 
externalities—are at the core of why regulators regulate.29 In that way, governments provide 
public goods, redistribute income, and shield and support preferred activities, whether economic 
or not.30 Hence, regulatory autonomy is necessary for national regulators to be able to address 
these issues themselves, in an autonomous manner. More practically, however, regulatory 
autonomy is equally valuable because states opt for differing regulatory goals and methods, and 
their population has different needs and habits.31 
In conclusion, in the context of this report, regulatory autonomy can be defined as: 
‘how much margin of appreciation is left to democratic domestic governments in 
crafting their own regulations while at the same time fulfilling their [international 
trade law] obligations.’32 
 
For our purposes, this definition is the most suitable one found in the literature as it covers all 
relevant aspects of regulatory autonomy.  Nonetheless, as it does not explain the intricacies of 
the concept, it is necessary to address the concept in more detail in the next section. 
 
3.2 The multiple dimensions of constraints on regulatory autonomy 
 
Although it mostly fits our purposes, the simplicity of the definition noted above does not shed 
light on the many aspects of the trading system which constrain regulatory autonomy. In the 
literature, these various aspects have been stressed. However, as far as we know, these have 
not all been brought together. 33  Combining these various approaches, we construct five 
‘dimensions’ of constraints on regulatory autonomy in an attempt to construct a comprehensive 
meaning of what regulatory autonomy in the context of trade entails. In other words, we further 
assess the complexity of regulatory autonomy by categorising and explaining the various ways 
                                               
29
 Mattoo and Sauvé, ‘Domestic Regulation & Trade in Services: Looking Ahead’ 223. See, extensively, Krajewski 11-
40 and Delimatsis 37-83. Also see Richard Janda, ‘GATS Regulatory Disciplines Meet Global Public Goods: the 
Case of Transportation Services’ in Aaditya Mattoo and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Domestic Regulation & Service Trade 
Liberalization (World Bank & Oxford University Press 2003) 114-117 on the distinction between private good failures 
and public good failures as opposed to the overarching market failure category. Each category has its own types of 
failure and subsequent regulatory response. 
30
 Bernard M Hoekman and Patrick A Messerlin, ‘Liberalising Trade in Services: Reciprocal Negotiations and 
Regulatory Reform’ in Pierre Sauvé and Robert M Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade 
Liberalization (Brookings Institution 2000) 489. 
31
 Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Joel P Trachtman, ‘From Policed Regulation to Managed Recognition in GATS’ in Pierre 
Sauvé and Robert M Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Brookings Institution 
2000) 248. 
32
 Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-discrimination to Harmonization’ 274. 
Du’s definition only applies to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. However, we do not see a problem in 
transposing this definition to comprise all WTO obligations. 
33
 Du is the author who has come closest. See ibid and Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the 
GATT/WTO Regime’. 
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in which it may be constrained. This highlights that an understanding of constraints on 
regulatory autonomy, of course, goes hand in hand with the concept of regulatory autonomy 
itself: for each dimension of regulatory autonomy, there are sources of constraint. In this sense, 
regulatory autonomy and constraints thereof are two sides of the same coin. 
 
3.2.1 The first dimension: Endogenous and exogenous regulatory autonomy 
 
The first dimension of regulatory autonomy is shaped by a summa divisio between endogenous 
and exogenous constraints on regulatory autonomy. Endogenous regulatory autonomy is 
constrained by a combination of limited financial, human, institutional and infrastructural 
resources and capacity, and policy acceptability by national stakeholders.34 In other words, it is 
a set of domestic constraints on regulatory autonomy stemming from practical problems and 
political forces, and perhaps legal obligations. Some of these constraints function quite 
explicitly, but others may be implicit, in which case it is important to make them explicit, 
acknowledge their relevance and contest them.35 It seems that the study of constraints on 
endogenous regulatory autonomy is largely within the fields of political sciences and 
government administration. As a result of this, a technical legal analysis, such as the one 
adopted here, is not the proper way to address such issues. Therefore, this report only 
addresses exogenous regulatory autonomy, which requires that domestic policies do not conflict 
with national commitments and obligations under bi-, pluri- or multilateral agreements. 
 
Endogenous and exogenous regulatory autonomy both play a key role in assessing the effective 
amount of regulatory autonomy, which results from the combination of both types of regulatory 
autonomy. The amount of effective regulatory autonomy varies in time as endogenous and 
exogenous conditions change: the latter through the conclusion of trade agreements or the legal 
interpretations of obligations and commitments, the former more easily as the result of many 
different factors ranging from budgeting to consumer preferences. Hence, the level of 
endogenous regulatory autonomy would appear to be in a constant state of flux. Thus, given a 
specific level of exogenous regulatory autonomy, the level of effective regulatory autonomy may 
vary significantly from country to country based on differences in endogenous regulatory 
autonomy.36 
 
It has been argued that constraining exogenous regulatory autonomy may lead to an increase in 
endogenous regulatory autonomy by inducing domestic reforms leading to more effectiveness 
which may have been politically impossible without external pressures and capacity building.37 
This system of domestic political leverage of using ‘international obligations’ to advance and 
explain domestic policies is a familiar trick of the trade for domestic politicians in the EU 
                                               
34
 Robert M Hamwey, Expanding National Policy Space for Development: Why the Multilateral Trading System Must 
Change (South Centre Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (TRADE) Working Paper 25, 2005) 3. 
35
 Lang 806. 
36
 Hamwey 3-4 and 6; Alvaro Santos, ‘Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade 
Organization: The Experience of Brazil & Mexico’ (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 551, 553. 
37
 Chris Milner, ‘Constraining and Enhancing Policy Space: The WTO and Adjusting to Globalisation’ (2009) 3 Journal 
of International Trade and Diplomacy 127. 
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Member States: Brussels made us do it! However, this trade-off has been criticised and is 
exactly the pinnacle of debate on regulatory autonomy in the context of developing countries—
to which we come back.38 
 
Although we clearly focus on exogenous regulatory autonomy, this summa divisio should be 
kept in mind when discussing regulatory autonomy. Although our approach is legal, political and 
societal factors cannot be entirely dismissed. In this sense, the endogenous dimension of 
regulatory autonomy should serve as a reference point for our future discussion. 
 
3.2.2 The second dimension: The interest a measure aims to advance 
 
The second (and best-known and most discussed) dimension of constraints on regulatory 
autonomy deals with constraints relating to the interest which the governmental measure aims 
to advance. In this regard, three useful distinctions can be made. First, and most obviously, the 
measure may address an economic interest or a non-economic interest. In the context of 
international trade law, this distinction is quite obvious as in the former case, it can be much 
more easily accepted that trade rules restrict the regulatory autonomy of domestic regulators. 
However, friction on, including rules on trade and investment or competition policies in the WTO 
framework, show that domestic regulators are not ready to allow all economic policies to be 
scrutinised under enforceable trade obligations.39 Increasingly, however, such issues are being 
tackled in bi- or plurilateral contexts—a result of many trade policy’s focus on market integration. 
In the context of the EU, an avid supporter of the inclusion of other aspects of economic policy 
than hard core trade policy into the realm of the WTO and its trade agreements, it is likely that 
the clash between economic policies and trade obligations will cause less concern to domestic 
regulators (and their constituencies). Nonetheless, this is definitely not always the case, as 
constraints on regulatory autonomy may impede certain regulatory action deemed appropriate. 
For example, in the context of the financial crisis, it appeared clear that the WTO compliance of 
measures pursuing economic goals may also be delicate.40 
 
However, debates get fired up most when it comes to non-economic interests: when regulators 
face policy constraints in areas such as public health or environmental policies, trade law is 
often understood as being overly restrictive. As we will come back to this issue, suffice to 
highlight here that the impact of international trade law on non-trade issues, especially those 
considered sensitive by a society, is, from a political and societal point of view, of course less 
                                               
38
 For example, see Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade: As if Development Really Mattered (United 
Nations Development Programme Background Paper, 2001). 
39
 Trade and investment and competition policies are two of four so-called Singapore Issues. The other two are 
government procurement and trade facilitation. See, for example, Stephen Woolcock, ‘The Singapore Issues in 
Cancún: A Failed Negotiation Ploy or a Litmus Test for Global Governance?’ (2003) 38 Intereconomics 249. 
40
 See, for example, Bart De Meester, ‘Testing European Prudential Conditions for Banking Mergers in the Light of 
Most Favoured Nation in the GATS’ (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 609; and Kevin P Gallagher, 
‘Losing Control: Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements’ (2011) 
29 Development Policy Review 387. 
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easy to explain as it appears to put trade in front of other interests. Moreover, in this context, the 
risk of trade dispute settlement bodies second-guessing domestic non-trade policies is real.41 
 
The distinction between regulatory autonomy to enact measures for economic and for non-
economic reasons is crucial in the debate on regulatory autonomy and development.42 This 
body of literature is based around two opposite positions. At one end, the argument is made that 
developing countries need to substantially liberalise trade in order to benefit from the trading 
system. On the other end, it is stated that the current rules of the international trading system 
restrict the regulatory autonomy of developing countries to use policy instruments which have 
greatly benefited developed countries in the past. Proponents of the latter stance also hold that 
many developing countries cannot cope with the adverse effects of substantial trade 
liberalisation, whilst developed countries are able to do so much better. Moreover, forcing such 
countries to focus on trade liberalisation reduces the available funds and capacity to enhance 
domestic issues, which are deemed more important from a development perspective by these 
authors. 
 
Moreover, this debate highlights the differences in expectations and needs from (constraints on) 
regulatory autonomy. Hence, arguments have been made for a conception of regulatory 
autonomy which allows developed countries to address non-trade issues such as labour, 
environment and health whilst developing countries are given sufficient regulatory autonomy to 
‘position themselves better for globalisation through economic restructuring and 
                                               
41
 See infra, on ‘trade and …’ problems, and exemplified by the AB’s famous statement, incited by claims that the 
WTO is environment unfriendly:  
‘In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided in this appeal. We 
have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment is of no significance to the 
Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members 
of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. 
Clearly, they can and should. And we have not decided that sovereign states should not act together 
bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect 
endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do.’ 
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/AB/R, AB report adopted 6 
November 1998 para. 185 (emphasis in the original). 
42
 See, for example, Rodrik; Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (W W Norton & Company 2002); 
Hamwey; Bernard M Hoekman, ‘Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and 
Differential Treatment’ (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law 405; Ha-Joon Chang, ‘Policy Space in 
Historical Perspective with Special Reference to Trade and Industrial Policies’ (2006) 41 Economic and Political 
Weekly 627; Alisa DiCaprio and Kevin P Gallagher, ‘The WTO and the Shrinking of Development Space: How Big is 
the Bite?’ (2006) 7 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 781; Patrick A Messerlin, ‘Enlarging the Vision for Trade 
Policy Space: Special and Differentiated Treatment and Infant Industry Issues’ (2006) 29 The World Economy 1395; 
Dani Rodrik, ‘How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders’ (2007) 1 Journal of International Trade and 
Diplomacy 1; Milner; Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (W 
W Norton & Company 2011); Santos; and Dominic Coppens, ‘How Special is the Special and Differential Treatment 
under the SCM Agreement? A Legal and Normative Analysis of WTO Subsidy Disciplines on Developing Countries’ 
(2013) 12 World Trade Review 79. 
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diversification.’ 43  This is linked to what has been called ‘the Geneva consensus’, an idea 
according to which trade liberalisation is necessary, but insufficient for development, as it needs 
to be flanked by assistance in dealing with adjustment costs from trade liberalisation and, more 
generally, aid.44 Although deemed insufficient by many stakeholders, the inclusion of special 
and differential treatment provisions in various WTO agreements, for example in Articles IV and 
XII GATS and the services waiver which allows preferential treatment of service suppliers from 
least-developed countries (LDCs), is a recognition hereof. 
 
Second, and mostly a refinement of the previously addressed distinction between economic and 
non-economic interests, a distinction between governmental measures generally and actions by 
administrative agencies concerning trade remedies may be useful. 45  The latter, which are 
comprised of anti-dumping actions, countervailing duties on subsidised imports and safeguards, 
                                               
43
 Rodrik, ‘How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders’ 21. Further on, Rodrik states that ‘my argument is that 
we need to recognise these frictions and focus our efforts on devising rules that can manage them, instead of 
proceeding with a market-opening agenda as if they were of little consequence.’ A better understanding of these 
frictions is required to devise rules to deal with them, and that is exactly what this report strives for. 
44
 Lamy used the term in a statement when running for Director-General in 2006. He noted: 
‘I consider that there remains so much to do that the priority must be to re-balance the international 
trade system in favour of developing countries. 
Of course, and as I have said in the past trade opening is not a sufficient condition, in the sense that its 
benefits depend largely on the quality of flanking policies. But it is a necessary condition, which must 
be better accompanied. I believe that we share this view, on what one might call “a Geneva 
consensus”, of some sort.’ 
Pascal Lamy, ‘WTO Director-General Selection Process 2005: Candidate Stement by Pascal Lamy’ (2005)  
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/stat_lamy_e.htm> accessed 4 December 2013. Later, Lamy, although still 
focusing on developing countries, extended the notion of the Geneva consensus beyond developing countries, as he 
stated that the Geneva  
‘consensus concerns the relative weight to be given, if one wants to prioritize development, to 
economic liberalization, international official aid, and the finalizing of multilateral rules. […] It also 
implies assistance […] to deal with the imbalances created, as I have just said, between winners and 
losers from trade liberalization, imbalances that are the more dangerous the more fragile the 
economies, societies or countries.’ 
Pascal Lamy, Global Governance: Lessons from Europe (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
Discussion Paper Series No 20051, 2005) 9. Also see World Trade Organization, ‘“Humanising Globalization”’ (2006)  
<www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl16_e.htm> accessed 4 December 2013 (where Lamy notes that ‘We must 
create a new “Geneva consensus”: a new basis for the opening up of trade that takes into account the resultant cost 
of adjustment’); World Trade Organization, ‘Lamy: It's Time for a New “Geneva Consensus” on Making Trade Work 
for Development’ (2006)  <www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl45_e.htm> accessed 4 December 2013. More 
recently, Lamy clearly extended the scope of the Geneva consensus beyond the realm of the WTO, arguing for 
example in favour of coordination between the WTO and human rights organisations. See World Trade Organization, 
‘Lamy Calls for Mindset Change to Align Trade and Human Rights’ (2010)  
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm> accessed 4 December 2013. More extensively, see 
Pascal Lamy, The Geneva Consensus: Making Trade Work for All (Cambridge University Press 2013). For a critical 
appraisal, see Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Role of Human Rights in Shaping International Regulatory Regimes’ (2012) 
79 Social Research 785, especially at 791-794.  
45
 William J Davey, ‘Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded its Authority? A Consideration of Deference 
Shown by the System to Member Government Decisions and its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques’ (2001) 4 
Journal of International Economic Law 79, 80. 
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are less likely to be of serious concern to domestic regulators considering that they fall within 
the more traditional realm of hard core trade policy. Moreover, as the many trade remedy cases 
before the WTO dispute settlement bodies demonstrate,46 trade remedies are fundamental to 
the WTO. In any case, considering that these agreements discipline key economic policy 
instruments, their impact on regulatory autonomy should not be neglected.  
 
Third, and building on the previous distinctions, constraints on regulatory autonomy may from a 
policymaking perspective lead to several situations. First, constraints may lead to a situation 
where it is no longer possible to make efficient use of a certain policy instrument.47 For example, 
rules disciplining the use of subsidies may mean that, in some cases, a regulator can no longer 
efficiently make use of a subsidy to advance a certain policy goal.48 Second, a regulator may 
have to refrain from advancing certain policy goals. Irrespective of the way in which a regulator 
aims to achieve a policy goal, i.e. irrespective of the policy instrument used, constraints from 
international trade law may prohibit this. For instance, a protectionist policy goal would, in many 
cases and irrespective of the policy instrument used, be contrary to trade law obligations. Of 
course, these two situations are not mutually exclusive nor do they capture the full range of 
possibilities. Often, non-compliance with international trade obligations is likely to be remediable 
by altering the incompliant measure. 
 
3.3.3 The third dimension: Macro level constraints stemming from trade agreements 
 
After having pointed out constraints on regulatory autonomy from the point of view of domestic 
regulators, the third dimension of constraints on regulatory autonomy addresses the WTO and 
trade agreements at a macro level. Three facets of the WTO as an organisation or in the 
process of negotiating RTAs can be identified as ‘potential sources of constraint’: (i) trade 
negotiations, (ii) trade rules, and (iii) the interpretation of trade rules by the dispute settlement 
organs.49 Although the former source of constraint is outside the scope of this report,50 it is clear 
                                               
46
 At the time of writing, 99 cases cited the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 97 cases cited the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement in the request for consultations and 43 cases cited the Agreement on Safeguards on a total 
of 467 cases. By comparison, only 23 cases cite GATS. 
47
 Roessler 118-119 and 126-127. Roessler considers there is regulatory autonomy as long as the WTO does not 
prescribe the adoption of specific regulations. As the WTO Agreements seldom do so, he argues that the WTO 
leaves ‘almost complete regulatory freedom’ to pursue these objectives. Hence, Roessler does not consider 
limitations on the use of policy instruments as limitations on regulatory autonomy. Moreover, he argues that 
limitations on the use of certain policy instruments amount to an obligation to use the most efficient policy instrument 
to attain a certain policy objective. 
48
 See, extensively, Dominic Coppens, ‘Balancing Policy Space and Policy Constraints? A Critical Legal Analysis of 
WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ (PhD Thesis, KU Leuven 2010). 
49
 Milner 129. The author only addresses economic concerns, but the argument is extendable to our understanding of 
regulatory autonomy. 
50
 But it has been addressed by the author in another report, see Bregt Natens, The Doha Round and the Future 
Architecture Of The Multilateral Regulation Of Trade In Services (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Working Paper 110, 2013) and a follow-up publication, see Bregt Natens and Jan Wouters, ‘The State of Play and 
Future of Services Negotiations in the WTO’ (2013) 4 Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law 235. It is 
also relevant to point to the argument for a ‘cosmopolitan GATS’: it judges by the global gains in economic welfare 
whether or not to introduce more regulatory disciplines in GATS, whilst protecting and respecting non-economic 
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that regulators should be aware of the potential impact of new trade rules on their regulatory 
autonomy. For example, the outcomes of the contentious and complicated negotiations on 
future disciplines for Article VI:4 GATS on domestic regulation would undoubtedly constrain 
regulatory autonomy, which explains the voluminous literature on the subject. 51  From a 
policymaking perspective, negotiations may prove to be key in balancing constraints on 
endogenous and exogenous regulatory autonomy. Moreover, the dynamic of trade negotiations, 
for example through peer pressure, time constraints and strong-arming or a more positive will to 
contribute to the greater good, may lead to an unanticipated and perhaps unexpected impact on 
regulatory autonomy. From our perspective—i.e. addressing existing constraints on regulatory 
autonomy—constraints on regulatory autonomy resulting from negotiations are perhaps more of 
a warning sign. Of course, once the potential of these constraints materialises, the result is an 
element of the second source of constraint: the trade rules. 
 
The trade rules and the interpretation thereof by the dispute settlement institutions constitute the 
second and third sources of constraint which make up this dimension of regulatory autonomy. It 
should be recalled that the multilateral regulatory framework on trade in services has remained 
largely unaltered since its inception in 1995, and that there are few indications for a 
breakthrough in the Doha Round. The preferential regulatory framework, however, differs 
substantially. On the one hand, the EU’s existing RTAs have not been altered after their 
conclusion so far—the rules therein thus remain the same. On the other hand, new RTAs are 
being negotiated continually and their services chapters, although often largely similar, vary in 
each case. Additionally, the interpretation of all of these rules by the relevant dispute settlement 
institutions shapes the rules considerably.52 Considering the different legal status of treaties and 
                                                                                                                                                       
values. Additionally, it is in favour of explicitly distributing the gains of trade liberalisation amongst many. See Marion 
Panizzon and Nicole Pohl, ‘Testing Regulatory Autonomy, Disciplining Trade Relief and Regulating Variable 
Peripheries: Can a Cosmopolitan GATS Do it All?’ in Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauvé (eds), GATS 
and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge University Press 2008) 5-6 and 15-16; Richard 
Janda and Mark Glynn, ‘ In Pursuit of the Cosmopolitan Vocation for Trade: GATS and Aviation Services’ in Marion 
Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauvé (eds), GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 566-595. 
51
 See, inter alia, Robert Howse and Elisabeth Türk, ‘The WTO Negotiations on Services: The Regulatory State up for 
Grabs’ (2002) 9 Canada Watch 3; Aaditya Mattoo and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Domestic Regulation & Service Trade 
Liberalization (World Bank & Oxford University Press 2003); Maxine Kennet, Jan Neumann and Elisabeth Türk, 
Second Guessing National Level Policy Choices: Necessity, Proportionality and Balance in the WTO Services 
Negotiations (Center for International Environmental Law Discussion Paper, 2003); Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Due 
Process and ‘Good’ Regulation Embedded in the GATS – Disciplining Regulatory Behaviour in Services through 
Article VI of the GATS ’ (2006) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 13; Suparna Karmakar, ‘Disciplining 
Domestic Regulations Under GATS and its Implications for Developing Countries: An Indian Case Study’ (2007) 41 
Journal of World Trade 127; Delimatsis, International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations: Necessity, 
Transparency and Regulatory Diversity; Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations 
in Services: The Best is Yet to Come’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 365; Jan Wouters and 
Dominic Coppens, ‘GATS and Domestic Regulation: Balancing the Right to Regulate and Trade Liberalization’ in 
Kern Alexander and Mads Andenas (eds), The World Trade Organization and Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff 
2008). 
52
 For example, see Nellie Munin, ‘The GATS: A Legal Perspective on Crossroads of Conflicting Interests’ (2011) 10 
World Trade Review 325, 330-340, who notes at page 340 that ‘in many cases the WTO adjudicating bodies seem to 
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case law, and the fact that the latter may considerably change throughout time, it is necessary 
to make a distinction between the two. However, in cases where dispute settlement institutions 
have interpreted a treaty provision, it is of course impossible to determine the meaning of the 
provision without making use of case law. Moreover, a stringent or unforeseen interpretation of 
certain legal obligations may considerably constrain regulatory autonomy. Similarly, a more 
relaxed interpretation may have the opposite effect. As can be expected, treaty interpretation is 
a key concern for regulatory autonomy, as illustrated in the case of the WTO by the debates on 
the so-called ‘aim and effects’ test,53 or the AB’s rigid textual interpretation.54 Considering that 
case law develops through time—and although there is hardly any case law from EU RTA 
dispute settlement—this source of constraint of regulatory autonomy is constantly evolving. 
Even more, it is evidence of the dynamic compromise between regulatory autonomy and trade 
liberalisation, a compromise which is ‘re-contested and redrawn’ every time a dispute settlement 
organ applies and interprets a key legal provision.55 
 
Furthermore, aside from the relevant institutions which decide on the dispute before them, the 
parties to the dispute play a role in the process of interpretation. Through lawyering and 
litigation, parties can insistently and strategically advance legal interpretations favourable to or 
preferred by them, and challenge unfavourable interpretations.56  
 
In this regard, it is also crucial to point at the binding nature of WTO dispute settlement: the 
jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system is compulsory and exclusive,57 and a Panel or 
AB Report will be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) unless all Members agree by 
consensus not to adopt the report.58 Moreover, there is an impressive compliance record by 
Members with adverse rulings.59 Of course, there is a grey zone of getting away with breaches 
of WTO obligations. Breaches with insufficient economic importance or minor international 
consequences are unlikely to be challenged. Moreover, temporary non-compliance with the 
rulings and recommendations of the DSB is possible, and, it is argued, should be, as it is an 
                                                                                                                                                       
prefer the interest of international trade liberalization over these interests – although extra efforts are made to 
disguise this motive behind ‘politically correct’ reasoning.’ 
53
 For example, see Hudec; Amelia Porges and Joel P Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The 
Resurrection of Aim and Effects’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 783; James Flett, ‘WTO Space for National 
Regulation: Requiem for a Diagonal Vector Test’ (2013) 16 Journal of International Economic Law 37. 
54
 For example, see Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-discrimination to 
Harmonization’. 
55
 Lang 837. 
56
 For example, see Santos 571-632. Santos illustrates this theory in the WTO context with the US – Tuna saga, in 
which the US sought, and partially got, an interpretation of Article XX (g) GATT which went ‘from outright prohibition 
of this trade restriction […] to favourable permission.’ As the author notes, this requires substantial legal capacity. 
57
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 6.1 and 23.1. Recourse to a Panel 
is not the only method of dispute resolution in WTO law: other methods foreseen in the DSU are consultations, 
arbitration, good offices, conciliation and mediation. 
58
 Ibid 16.4 and 17.14. 
59
 See Bruce Wilson, ‘Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to 
Date’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 397. 
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essential form of flexibility needed in the decision to constrain regulatory autonomy by 
undersigning to WTO rules.60  
 
In the case of EU trade agreements, the legal status of the dispute settlement mechanisms is 
more complex, with three different dispute settlement models in use: political mechanisms, 
quasi-adjudicative mechanisms and hybrid mechanisms.61 Nonetheless, there is a noticeable 
trend towards quasi-adjudicative mechanisms, like the one in the WTO.62 Considering the lack 
of disputes before these mechanisms, two issues arise. First, the interpretation of the treaty 
provisions in the light of regulatory autonomy will undoubtedly pose problems, to which we 
come back in Chapter III. Second, one may question to which degree regulatory autonomy is 
truly constrained if there is no enforcement of the obligations at the level of the trade agreement. 
However, trade agreements being international agreements which are binding for the EU 
institutions and Member States,63 there is an internal dimension of enforcement as well. From 
the perspective of constraints on EU regulatory autonomy, this covers two distinctive situations. 
First, the European Commission supervises Member States’ compliance with the obligations 
contained in the international obligations which come within the scope of EU agreements, such 
as the Common Commercial Policy (CCP).64 Second, considering that the acts of EU institutions 
must also comply with the obligations in international agreements, such acts could be 
incompatible with the obligations contained in international agreements. In such cases, Member 
States or the institutions may bring claims against the institution responsible for the act 
breaching the international agreement.65 Nonetheless, the European Court of Justice appears to 
be relatively reluctant in finding that national provisions are incompatible with obligations 
contained in international agreements, although some case law exists.66 Furthermore, there is 
only one case in which the European courts found an act by an EU institution to be incompatible 
with such obligations.67 In any case, from a legal perspective, the sheer existence of obligations 
and commitments in EU trade agreements obviously constrains regulatory autonomy. 
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 See Claus D Zimmermann, ‘Toleration of Temporary Non-Compliance: The Systemic Safety Valve of WTO Dispute 
Settlement Revisited’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 382. 
61
 Edna Ramírez Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade 
Agreements: Is the Quasi-Adjudicative Model a Trend or is it Just Another Model? (World Trade Organization 
Economic Research and Statistics Division Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, 2006) 
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 Ignacio Garcia Bercero, ‘Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned?’ in 
Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 383-405. 
63
 Article 216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
64
 Article 258 TFEU. See Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, European Union Law (Robert Bray and Nathan 
Cambien eds, 3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 863. The situation is different for the WTO Agreements: see ibid 868-
871. 
65
 Article 263 TFEU. 
66
 ECJ, Joined Cases 194 and 241/85 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1037; ECJ, Case C-469/93 Chiquita Italia 
[1995] ECR I-4533; ECJ, Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989; ECJ, Case C-465/01 
Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-8291; ECJ, Case C-239/03 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-9325. See 
Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 863. 
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 CFI, Case T-115/94 Opel Austria v Council [1997] ECR II-39. See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 864. 
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3.3.4 The fourth dimension: Three steps in establishing a trade law violation 
 
Building on the macro dimension of constraints on regulatory autonomy stemming from trade 
agreements, the fourth dimension of regulatory autonomy is found at the level of the substance 
of a WTO agreement or other trade agreement. It addresses the frequently recurring three steps 
of finding a measure by a domestic regulator to be inconsistent with an obligation. First, the 
measure must fall within the scope of the agreement. Second, the measure must violate an 
obligation contained in the agreement. And third, the measure cannot be justified by an 
exception. All three elements are equally crucial to the impact of obligations on regulatory 
autonomy,68 which is why this report will address all of them. It should be noted that the reality 
of these steps to establish a trade law violation has been criticised for being inherently biased 
towards trade because other societal values only play a role in the justification phase.69 
 
Several authors have approached this three-legged dimension of regulatory autonomy in a more 
fragmented way by explicitly considering specific parts of it as crucial.70 For example, some 
authors consider the combination of obligations and the general exceptions provision Article XIV 
GATS crucial to ‘drawing the parameters’ for regulatory autonomy.71 Other authors only identify 
Article XIV GATS as the key instrument to preserve regulatory autonomy. 72  However, 
considering the encompassing aim of this report, we will address all three elements in our 
analysis of regulatory autonomy. 
 
Additionally, a specificity of trade in services must be highlighted. In GATS, and in many cases 
of preferential liberalisation of trade in services, the national treatment and market access 
obligations are conditional upon the scheduling of specific commitments. Hence, the scope of 
these key obligations is determined by the Schedules of specific commitments: only insofar as 
commitments have been scheduled for a certain (sub)sector do national treatment and/or 
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 See Lang. Also see Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-discrimination to 
Harmonization’ and Reid 878. All three authors approach regulatory autonomy by addressing all three steps outlined 
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 For example, see Sungjoon Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation: A Reform Agenda of the Global Trading 
System (Kluwer Law International 2003) 2-5. 
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market access obligations apply.73 In this respect, several authors have pointed at the specific 
relevance of these Schedules of specific commitments. 74  Because the Schedules contain 
party’s commitments and limitations to these commitments, the interpretation of the Schedules 
is crucial. If, in interpreting a commitment, a wide interpretation is given, measures affecting 
services in the sector covered by the commitment are subjected to the market access and 
national treatment obligations.75  Therefore, the interpretation of the Schedules is directly linked 
to concerns about constraints on regulatory autonomy.76 Considering that the interpretation of 
Schedules is a highly complex undertaking due to, inter alia, substantial changes in the way in 
which services are traded and a lack of prior scheduling experience—and as confirmed by the 
US – Gambling saga in which the interpretation of the U.S. Schedule of specific commitments 
on remote gambling services was a central issue—such concerns are far from hypothetical. 
 
3.3.5 The fifth dimension: The nature of the obligation 
 
The last dimension of constraints on regulatory autonomy is linked to the nature of the obligation 
which may be violated by a measure. Without engaging too much in debates on exact 
delineation, obligations contained in international trade law can be characterised as belonging to 
one of three types: (i) non-discrimination obligations, (ii) obligations related to market access 
sensu lato and (iii) obligations arising from recognition based regimes, such as mutual 
recognition, international standardisation, and harmonisation.77 As noted supra, the goal of each 
type of obligation differs. Whilst non-discriminatory obligations only address situations in which 
de jure or de facto discrimination between domestic and foreign products or services (suppliers) 
arises, market access obligations also discipline non-discriminatory measures which restrict 
certain aspects of access to a domestic market for foreign goods or services (suppliers), thus 
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aiming to liberalise ‘trade as such’.78 Recognition-based regimes generally aim at the deep 
integration of markets, and, contrary to the first two types mentioned, entail positive integration. 
This distinction based on the nature of the trade law obligation is relevant as constraints 
increase from non-discrimination to market access sensu lato to recognition based regimes. 
However, each type of obligation also has distinct features as concerns their impact on 
regulatory autonomy.   
 
As concerns the first type of obligation, a prohibition on de jure or de facto discriminatory 
measures may at first sight only mean regulators cannot distinguish between domestic and 
foreign products, or amid foreign, or services (suppliers). However, the specificities of an 
obligation—for example, depending on which categories of domestic and foreign products or 
producers are to be compared to establish discriminatory treatment—79 regulatory autonomy 
may still be significantly constrained by ‘mere’ anti-discrimination obligations. Several authors 
therefore consider the issue of facially neutral or incidentally discriminatory measures as a main 
concern for regulatory autonomy.80 According to two prominent authors, this category spans 
measures based on ‘devious bad faith’ to ‘innocent run-of-the-mine regulation’. They consider 
the most contentious cases those in which compliance with trade obligations has to be 
assessed for a measure which either has a limited but clear benefit, where the benefit is hard to 
foresee, or where evaluating the benefit entails ‘a difficult and possibly culturally based value 
judgment’.81 Thus, distinguishing between covert protectionism on the one hand, and measures 
without protectionist intent is key to balancing regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation.82 In 
this sense, it has been stated that the inclusion of de facto discrimination—and hence measures 
with a disparate impact—in the non-discrimination principle means it is a ‘less stable criterion’ to 
distinguish protectionist measures from legitimate regulation.83 
 
Considering the second type of obligation, i.e. related to market access sensu lato, the main 
issue for constraints on regulatory autonomy result from the fact that even measures that do not 
discriminate may be incompliant with trade rules. The rationale for creating such obligations is 
that non-discriminatory regulatory diversity creates costly barriers to trade, because compliance 
with varying regulation, of which services sectors have plenty, is expensive. 84  Hence, if 
regulators decide to change policies regarding certain economic issues for all, foreign and 
domestic, goods or services (suppliers), market access obligations may be violated. Domestic 
goods or services (suppliers), however, may be subjected to restrained market access. The 
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increased possibility of unduly constraints on regulatory autonomy of these market access 
obligations, in comparison to the more generally applied non-discrimination principle in trade 
law, highlights why such obligations are operationalized differently in various trade agreements. 
In the context of GATS, the market access obligation of Article XVI GATS is limited in scope to a 
closed list of six types of prohibited measures. 
 
Reliance on the third type of obligation, recognition based regimes, has been relatively limited, 
for the obvious reason that such regimes likely constrain regulatory autonomy most. For 
example, GATS only contains ‘embryonic’ features of positive integration, such as Article VI:4.85 
However, more recent developments in the liberalisation of trade in services signal an increased 
reliance on recognition based regimes. It is of course logical that bi- or plurilateral talks between 
negotiating partners with similar are much better suited to discuss recognition based regimes. 
Even more, in talks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the 
EU and the United States (U.S.), recognition based regimes have been formally identified as a 
central aspect to the deal.86 
 
3.3.6 Conclusion 
 
This section highlights five dimensions of the concept of regulatory autonomy and constraints 
thereof in international trade law. First, regulatory autonomy is defined and constrained by 
endogenous and exogenous factors. As a result, actual regulatory autonomy is in a constant 
state of flux. In the context of this report, we focus on exogenous regulatory autonomy. Second, 
regulatory autonomy may be constrained insofar as a regulator aims to advance an economic 
interest, or a non-economic interest. This distinction, which lies at the core of much of the 
debate on regulatory autonomy, has important consequences for the shaping of the tension 
between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation. Nonetheless, our wide approach to 
regulatory autonomy covers both. Third, exogenous constraints on regulatory autonomy may 
stem from three inextricable macro-level aspects of international trade law: trade negotiations, 
trade rules, and the interpretation of trade rules by the relevant dispute settlement organs. 
Considering our practical legal approach, we focus on existing trade rules and their 
interpretation. Fourth, considering the trade rules and their interpretation into more detail, 
constraints on regulatory autonomy are to be analysed according to the way in which a trade 
law violation is usually established. Practically, regulatory autonomy may be constrained by 
trade rules and the interpretation thereof throughout three stages: the measure under scrutiny 
must fall within the scope of the agreement, it must violate an obligation contained in the 
agreement, and it cannot be justified by an exception. In this report, we will consider all three 
elements. Fifth, constraints on regulatory autonomy may be linked to the nature of a trade law 
obligation, which may either be a non-discrimination obligation, a market access sensu lato 
obligation or a recognition based regime. 
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4. The inherent tension between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation 
 
It has famously been argued that, at its inception after the Second World War, the ‘deal’ for 
multilateral economic governance could only have been struck by balancing internal, i.e. social, 
and external, i.e. economic, stability. Hence, the post-war economic regimes do not constitute a 
form of liberalism-with-lots-of-cheating, but rather of ‘embedded liberalism’.87 The reduction of 
trade barriers has made national regulators more active in managing the adjustment costs of 
trade liberalisation. However, this is not to be seen as a ‘problem’ for the trade order, as it is a 
mere expression of one part of the embedded liberalism compromise: the trade regime was 
designed to balance its objectives in this way. As a result, allowing national regulators to uphold 
‘their side of the bargain’ is crucial for the success and even the viability of the multilateral 
trading order.88 However, the globalised world complicates national governments abilities to do 
so, as this part of the compromise is largely restricted to a national level.89  
 
In the case of trade governance, the liberalisation of trade has led to a binding set of rules and 
obligations, undersigned by all WTO Members, or, in the case of preferential liberalisation, the 
signatory parties. As with all international obligations, this necessarily implies a loss of 
regulatory autonomy: by agreeing to be bound by certain obligations, a domestic regulator may 
no longer adopt regulations which violate these international obligations. A sovereign regulator 
will only agree to restrict regulatory autonomy if this leads to acceptable quid pro quos.90 
Moreover, trade liberalisation obligations lead to domestic adjustment problems which may only 
be solved by enacting measures which may incidentally restrict trade.91 The GATT Contracting 
Parties knew that the multilateral trading order required a way of dealing with such internal 
problems, although it seems unlikely they imagined how complex this balance was to become 
with the broad trade agenda of the Uruguay Round. Although a similar balance has to be struck 
for all types of international cooperation, in the case of the WTO, an international organisation 
famous for its well-functioning and binding dispute settlement system, it must be stressed that 
other states may force compliance with these obligations by bringing disputes more easily and 
effectively than in other international constellation of cooperation. Hence, the balancing of 
competing rights, principles, values and interests becomes one of the most important 
challenges for WTO law.92 In other words, the need for a balance is inherent because trade 
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rules by nature impinge on other policy areas and trade restriction is an ‘inevitable corollary’ of 
policies with non-trade objectives.93 
 
Therefore, there is an inherent tension between international trade law obligations, which aim at 
trade liberalisation, and regulatory autonomy in post-war economic governance and 
consequently also in trade governance. It should be remarked that a legal approach to 
addressing this issue has its limits: 
‘in some ultimate sense the problem is unsolvable. Taken to their logical conclusion, 
either free trade or local autonomy could virtually eliminate the other, and 
negotiating a working border between the two depends as much on history, politics, 
and local terrain as on any overarching vision. No matter how a legal test is 
articulated, it cannot satisfactorily resolve the tensions between local autonomy and 
free trade in all conceivable cases. In the end, the law must have a certain 
irreducible messiness in dealing with such fundamental tensions. Messiness is not, 
however, the same as chaos.’94 
 
Being aware of this, this and subsequent reports can only strive to unravel some chaos in the 
hope of ending up with only a certain amount of irreducible messiness. 
 
5. The need for a case study and the suitability of the European Union 
 
5.1 A case study is most suited 
 
In the case of trade in services, the international constraints on regulatory autonomy reflect the 
international regulatory framework. On the one hand, the multilateral GATS rules, applicable to 
the whole WTO membership, provide a general framework for the multilateral international trade 
in services. On the other hand, many states have sought to deepen or widen trade obligations 
through bi- or plurilateral trade agreements. The result of these agreements is the preferential 
liberalisation of trade in services. Hence, when attempting to assess the tension between 
regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation in trade in services, one must address both 
liberalisation tracks. However, taking into account the inherent flexibilities of GATS, 95  and 
considering the proliferation of bi- and plurilateral trade agreements, it is evident that obligations 
arising from the liberalisation of trade in services differ substantially from country to country. 
Hence, it is impossible to assess constraints on regulatory autonomy from liberalisation in 
general.  
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For the purpose of an in-depth analysis of the impact of multilateral and preferential 
liberalisation of trade in services on regulatory autonomy, a case study is most suitable. In the 
case of multilateral obligations, all flexibilities will be addressed from the point of view of the 
selected WTO Member and as concerns bi- and plurilateral agreements, some of that country’s 
RTAs can be analysed. This approach has the benefit of allowing a comparative and cross-
cutting analysis, with a comprehensive outcome. 
 
5.2 The European Union is well-suited to be the subject of the case study 
 
This leaves the question of selecting a case study. As the title of this report highlights, we opt for 
the EU. However, a justification for this choice is necessary. First, it should be noted that 
Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signed the GATT on the 
first of January, 1948. Austria (1951), Denmark (1950), Finland (1950), Germany (1951), 
Greece (1950), Italy (1950) and Sweden (1950) were closely followed. Subsequently, the former 
European Communities were a founding Member of the WTO in 1995. Hence, the EU Member 
States have substantial experience with the multilateral regulation of trade. Moreover, the EU is 
a very active Member in WTO dispute settlement and has elaborate expertise in the European 
Commission.96 This likely indicates well thought-through specific commitments and exemptions 
which took into account prior experiences. Additionally, the EU has not only been very active in 
the WTO, it also concluded many RTAs with various types of partners. The selection of RTA 
case studies is thus one of abundance. 
 
Second, the EU is itself a ‘regional trading arrangement’, having created the largest single 
market in the world—the result of which was, although likely unintended, external trade policy 
liberalisation.97 Moreover, as Europeans, we are used to dealing with multilevel governance, 
balancing of interests, 98  and its implications for regulatory autonomy. As noted, regulatory 
autonomy is also an issue of allocation of competences. In the context of foreign trade, this has 
culminated in the EU’s exclusive competence as concerns the CCP. In that respect, Article 
21(2)(e) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that the EU’s external action aims to 
encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade. Article 207 TFEU makes explicit that 
the CCP shall be conducted in the context of those principles and objectives of the EU’s 
external action. Hence, free trade is, at the least, a foreign policy objective of the EU. Moreover, 
the CCP is not limited to economic interests: the CCP is a political tool and is used to on the one 
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hand defend the internal market and ensure trade benefits abroad, and on the other hand shape 
foreign governance and reproduce the EU’s model of regional integration.99 In this regard, it 
should be noted that Article 3(5) TEU obliges the EU to contribute, in its relations with the wider 
world, to ‘free and fair trade’ side by side with peace, security, sustainable development, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, the eradication of poverty and the protection of 
human rights.  
 
Third, the EU is—for now—still the world’s most powerful economic entity. In 2012, it’s nominal 
GDP was the largest in the world, with around 16.5 trillion US$ on a world GDP of 71.5 trillion 
US$.100 Services make up almost three quarters of that GDP. In 2012, and excluding intra-EU 
trade, the EU was the largest exporter of merchandise and the second largest importer of 
merchandise.101 Concerning services, in 2012, the EU was by far the largest exporter and 
importer.102 Hence, it is no surprise that the EU considers the liberalisation of trade in services 
an offensive interest, exemplified by a strong commitment to negotiating bi-, pluri- and 
multilateral agreements which address trade in services.  
 
Fourth, because of the size of its internal market and the collective character of its trade 
policy—i.e. in the CCP—which result in the ability to manipulate other countries’ positions and 
policies, the EU is to be considered as a ‘trade power’.103 Market size is important in this respect 
for two reasons. First, it affects incentives for other countries to decide whether or with whom to 
coordinate regulation, and second, it may cause other actors to converge to its own 
preferences.104 Hence, it is more of a rule maker rather than a rule taker. Consequently, it may 
have been and still be in the best position to have foreseen the impact of the liberalisation of 
trade in services on regulatory autonomy and thus build in necessary safety valves. On the one 
hand, some impacts on regulatory autonomy have been mitigated by, for example, keeping 
some services sectors outside services obligations. On the other hand, the EU has also made 
extensive commitments under GATS, as many services are an EU offensive interest. This has 
unavoidably led to some impact on regulatory autonomy. 
 
However, the EU is also a ‘conflicted trade power’: there is likely to be a conflict between the 
guiding principles of the EU, especially in the relationship between trade and non-trade 
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objectives. This is evident in, on the one hand, the EU’s power in trade—its exports of goods, 
services, capital, but also its protection of for example the agricultural sector; i.e. it’s offensive 
and defensive trade interests—and on the other hand, power through trade—the export of non-
trade standards and norms. 105  In this sense, the internal market—or, as noted, the EU’s 
experience with the allocation of competences—is crucial: it is argued that the EU is a ‘market 
power Europe’, for which the experience with the internal market forms a crucial link with the 
identity of the EU which ‘externalizes its economic and social market-related policies and 
regulatory measures.’ 106  However, the EU is also often considered overregulated and 
overprotective domestically. Hence, the tension between trade liberalisation and regulatory 
autonomy is inherent to the constitutional nature of the EU. 
 
In conclusion, the justifications outlined above demonstrate that, in the case of the EU, the 
tension between regulatory autonomy and the liberalisation of trade in services is likely to be 
very present and well-developed, and relatively thought-through. The combination of these 
factors makes the EU a prime target to assess the balance between regulatory autonomy and 
the liberalisation of trade in services. 
 
OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN GATS 
 
As is clear from the fourth dimension of regulatory autonomy, the three steps in establishing a 
breach of a trade law obligations are crucial to the tension between regulatory autonomy and 
trade liberalisation. The first step, i.e. assessing whether a contentious measure falls within the 
scope of GATS, has been addressed in the previous report of this research track. In this report, 
we assess the second step, i.e. assessing whether the measure breaches an obligation, for a 
first category of GATS obligations. In a subsequent report, we do so for all other obligations and 
we address whether a preliminary violation can be justified on the basis of one of the exceptions 
in GATS. 
 
1. The inherent flexibility in the structure of GATS obligations 
 
As a result of the novelty of regulating trade in services at the moment of its conclusion, and 
because of the sensitivities explained supra, GATS is an inherently flexible agreement.107 GATS 
obligations can be divided into three categories. First, unconditional general obligations apply to 
all services covered by the agreement, as established in the previous section. The second and 
third categories of obligations apply only to sectors in which specific commitments have been 
scheduled by the Member. 108  This category consists of two subcategories: the conditional 
                                               
105
 Meunier and Nicolaïdis 907 and 910-915. The authors also identify an internal conflict between the diverging 
interests of Member States and other domestic actors. Moreover, the consistency between internal and external 
policies are identified as crucial to the legitimate exercise of the EU’s power. 
106
 Damro 683. 
107
 Rudolf Adlung, ‘Services Negotiations in the Doha Round: Lost in Flexibility?’ (2006) 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law 865, 892. 
108
 For a very clear schematic overview of the structure of GATS obligations, see Adlung, ‘Public Services and the 
GATS’ 459.  
29 
 
general obligations of Part II of GATS and the specific commitments of Part III of GATS. The 
latter subcategory of obligations only applies to sectors for which commitments have been 
undertaken in the schedules of commitments and insofar no limitations to the specific 
commitments have been scheduled.109 The former subcategory contains obligations which only 
apply to sectors in which specific commitments have been scheduled, but these cannot be 
limited by scheduling limitations.110 Thus, they apply in full to a scheduled sector. Moreover, 
even the general and unconditional obligation to afford Most-Favoured-Nation treatment is 
limited by a list of individual exemptions, drawn up at the conclusion of GATS. 
 
2. The European Union’s extensive use of GATS’ flexibilities 
 
As noted, the EU and most of its Member States had extensive experience with the GATT 
before negotiating the WTO Agreement and all of its Annexes, including GATS. This is reflected 
in the use of the flexibilities of GATS: for example, no LDC listed more than six MFN 
exemptions, as did the overwhelming majority of developing countries, whilst in contrast more 
than half of the developed countries listed more than six.111 The EU listed 28 MFN exemptions 
in 1994, 112  the highest number of all Members—the second highest number being 18. 113 
Similarly, a look at the page length of the Schedules shows that most LDC and developing 
Members have Schedules from around four to 35 pages. The EU’s 1994 Schedule, again the 
longest, contained 96 pages.114 The EU’s consolidated 2006 Schedule contained 234 pages.115 
 
Of course, the complexity of the EU as an actor with now 28 Member States and their diverging 
interests partly explains this extensive use of GATS’ flexibilities. However, the EU’s experience 
with and knowledge of WTO law undoubtedly influenced the attention given to a precise and 
elaborate use of these options. In the following sections, we will address these commitments 
and limitations where appropriate, as they reflect how foreseeable and unwanted constraints on 
regulatory autonomy have been blocked or mitigated by the EU and its Member States. 
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3. Unconditional general obligations 
 
3.1 The Most-Favoured-Nation treatment obligation 
 
3.1.1 The scope of the obligation 
 
The MFN obligation of Article II GATS is the most important of the general unconditional 
obligations. It contains a general principle of non-discrimination, based on the principle of 
reciprocity and applies to any measure covered by GATS.116 Hence, it could be said that the 
liberalisation effect of MFN is ‘more momentous’ than under the national treatment obligation.117 
According to the first paragraph of the provision, a Member must (i) immediately and 
unconditionally accord treatment no less favourable to services and service suppliers of a 
Member, whether de jure or de facto,118 (ii) than to like services or service suppliers of any other 
Member. The MFN obligation thus does not prevent a Member from treating domestic services 
or service suppliers more favourably than foreign ones. Its primary purpose is to ‘ensure all 
WTO Members equality of opportunity’ for services and services suppliers.119 Moreover, Article 
II:1 GATS expressly refers to it covering ‘any measure covered by this agreement.’ Hence, in 
the case of Mode 3 supply of services, this is said to apply to both the pre- and post-
establishment phases.120 In comparison to the GATT MFN obligation, Article II GATS has a 
broader scope because it applies to all measures affecting trade in services, and to services 
and service suppliers alike.121 
 
3.1.2 How the Most-Favoured-Nation treatment obligation may limit regulatory autonomy 
 
The MFN obligation thus does not prevent a Member from treating domestic services or service 
suppliers more favourably than foreign ones. Consequently, at first sight, the impact of the MFN 
obligation in abstracto on regulatory autonomy ‘seems relatively minor’ as a difference in 
treatment is usually created by differentiating between domestic and foreign services or service 
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suppliers.122 This holds specifically in the case of services supplied by a governmental body of a 
Member.123 However, issues may nonetheless arise.  
 
The MFN obligation does not prevent a Member from precluding market access in that sector to 
all foreign service suppliers, but might discourage granting beneficial treatment to third states as 
such treatment must be extended to all third Members.124 In this sense, it is an instrument to 
multilateralise the reduction of barriers to trade in services.125 However, in abstracto, an MFN 
obligation in services may substantially constrain regulatory autonomy because the scope for 
inconsistencies is naturally wider in services than in goods as a result of GATS’ broad scope, 
which also includes the movement of capital and labour.126 Consider, for example, differences 
between foreign service suppliers as concerns their respective professional culture or legal 
protection for consumers. It may well be in the interest of domestic legislators to introduce 
regulations which may at first sight appear difficult to reconcile with the MFN obligation. A 
specific example of this is the case of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Subsequently, the 
legal tests which are applied to establish a violation of Article II GATS are equally important to 
regulatory autonomy.127 According to the Panel in EC – Bananas III,  
‘For purposes of Article II, it is necessary to examine (i) whether services or service 
suppliers originating in different foreign countries are "like" and (ii) whether services or 
service suppliers of the complainant's origin are subject to less favourable treatment 
than those of other Members' origin.’128 
 
The exemptions from its scope also play a role. We address these issues in the following 
sections. 
 
3.1.3 Bilateral investment treaties 
 
As noted, a specific example of the previously discussed potential for constraint is linked to 
BITs. As noted, GATS Mode 3 covers certain aspects of foreign investment. Even more, the 
potential of services liberalisation to promote investment through establishment is key, as 
‘presence-impeding’ measures in investment are very often linked to services. 129  However, 
countries around the world have concluded BITs, which often afford more favourable treatment 
to investors from those Members than to other investors. Moreover, the benefits differ from BIT 
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to BIT, and no Member has concluded BITs with all other Members.130 Hence, in principle the 
GATS MFN obligation would apply to BITs and benefits from the agreement and may thus need 
to be extended on an MFN basis to all other WTO Members.131 Moreover, many BITs are 
unlikely to satisfy the conditions of a necessary exception to the MFN obligation.132 This finding 
may have chilled negotiators’ will to conclude the failed negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI), conducted in the seat of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 133  Additionally, it has been noted that Korea and Japan, during 
negotiations on a BIT, discussed the issue.134 Moreover, several Members have listed MFN 
exemptions for Mode 3 referring to BITs with non-specified partner countries,135 possibly in 
order to limit the effects an extension of benefits awarded under BITs on an MFN basis. 
However, such an approach may not be consistent with the wording of Article II:2 GATS on 
MFN exemptions, which states that Members ‘may maintain’ a measure inconsistent with the 
obligation.136 
 
In the case of the EU, the List of MFN exemptions contains an entry for measures based on 
existing or future bilateral agreements between the EU and certain Member States on the one 
hand, and San Marino, Monaco, Andorra, Vatican City State on the other. The exemption 
applies to the right of establishment for juridical and natural persons (and for waiving the 
requirements of work permits for natural persons supplying services).   According to the List, the 
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conditions creating the need for the exemption are the geographical situation and historical, 
economic and cultural links between the EU Member States and the countries and principalities 
concerned.137 Nonetheless, the limited scope of this exemption does not cover all BITs. 
 
To establish whether a BIT may violate the MFN obligation, first, the BIT must be a measure 
covered by GATS, which does immediately and unconditionally accord treatment no less 
favourable to services and service suppliers of a Member than to like services or service 
suppliers of any other Member. As noted supra, the scope of GATS is very broad, and there are 
no indications that the BIT itself, or its ratification and incorporation into the domestic legal 
order, would be exempted from it.138 Second, services and service suppliers covered by the BIT 
must be considered like with those who are not. We will consider the issue of likeness into more 
detail in the following section. Suffice to refer here to the finding that when the ‘services in 
question in a particular case are essentially or generally the same in competitive terms’, they 
are like.139 As concerns the likeness of service suppliers, the Panels in China – Electronic 
Payment Services and China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, where it was held that 
when origin is the only factor on which a measure bases a difference of treatment between 
domestic service suppliers and foreign suppliers, the service suppliers are like.140 It is the BIT 
itself which introduces such an origin-based discrimination.141 Of course, a factual case-by-case 
analysis needs to be undertaken.142 Nonetheless, in general, it seems that the existence of a 
BIT between two Members does not make the services provided by, or the investors 
themselves, from a party to the BIT unlike an investor or its services from another Member. 
Third, the treatment awarded to investors from non-parties to the BIT must be awarded 
treatment less favourable than investors from parties to the agreement. Again, we will address 
this condition into more detail infra. However, some illustrations highlight the range of BIT 
provisions which may afford less favourable treatment to non-parties: consider, for example, the 
possibility for investors of parties to a BIT to make use of an investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism which may upset the competitive relationship between the service suppliers, 
as may other investment protection and liberalisation provisions which go beyond GATS 
commitments such as commitment to fair and equitable treatment or guarantees against 
expropriation.143 
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For now, however, no cases have been brought in which the compliance of BITs with the MFN 
obligation in GATS have been discussed. This may be linked more generally to the very limited 
attention to regional integration in dispute settlement.144 Reasons for the lack of bringing the 
question of WTO compliance of RTAs and BITs are likely to include the fact that ‘everybody 
does it.’ According to UNCTAD, there were 2,857 BITs in force in 2013.145 And even Mongolia, 
the last Member not to be party to one of many hundreds of RTAs, is currently negotiating 
several potential agreements. The fear of opening a floodgate of claims may play a role in the 
decision not to bring a case before the WTO. But, perhaps more importantly, such a claim could 
also destabilise the WTO in its complex relationship with regional economic integration 
agreements. Nonetheless, legally speaking, it is likely that ‘investment treaties effectively 
provide for open regionalism’ in the economically crucial Mode 3 services supply, although this 
may be without the full awareness of all actors involved.146 From the perspective of regulatory 
autonomy, this is undoubtedly a key feature as the proverbial dispute peace may at any time 
escalate into a war in which benefits from many BITs may need to be multilateralised on an 
MFN basis, thereby going far beyond the intensions of the negotiators.  
 
3.1.4 The interpretation of ‘likeness’ 
 
The interpretation of ‘likeness’, a term found in various key WTO provisions, remains highly 
complex although the condition has been interpreted repeatedly by both panels and the AB. Its 
relevance for regulatory autonomy is clear:  
‘the broader the WTO adjudicating bodies construe the concept of ‘likeness’, the 
more intrusive the non-discrimination obligation becomes, which in turn intensifies 
the obligation’s liberalizing effect.’147 
 
Hence, the determination of whether services are like is of crucial importance. However, dispute 
settlement has provided relatively little guidance. As a result, the Panel in EC – Bananas III, 
when addressing Article II GATS for the first time, turned to Article XVII GATS for interpretative 
guidance.148 The AB, however, overruled the Panel and stated that, although not necessarily 
irrelevant, the ‘Panel would have been on safer ground had it compared the MFN obligation in 
Article II of the GATS with the MFN and MFN-type obligations in the GATT 1994.’ 149 
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Nonetheless, in the specific context of trade in services, it is argued that likeness in Articles II 
and XVII GATS should be interpreted identically.150 
 
In the case of services, an added difficulty is the question of likeness of service suppliers: it 
must be recalled that Article II:1 GATS states that no less favourable treatment shall be 
accorded than that a Member accords ‘to like services and service suppliers of any other 
country.’ The Panels in EC – Bananas III and Canada – Autos, the first to address whether this 
wording constitutes a double requirement of likeness of both service and service supplier, stated 
that ‘at least to the extent that entities provide these like services, they are like service suppliers’ 
and ‘to the extent that the service suppliers concerned supply the same services, they should be 
considered "like" for the purpose of this case’.151 It must be stressed that in both cases, the 
respondent did not claim that the services and service suppliers were not like and the 
interpretation of likeness was not a decisive issue.152 In a later case, the Panel’s attention 
shifted focus towards the likeness of the service supplier, arguing that  
‘when origin is the only factor on which a measure bases a difference of treatment 
between domestic service suppliers and foreign suppliers, the "like service 
suppliers" requirement is met, provided there will, or can, be domestic and foreign 
suppliers that under the measure are the same in all material respects except for 
origin.’153  
 
Interestingly, these substantially limited interpretations of likeness were not appealed and the 
AB did not pronounce on the issue in either EC – Bananas, Canada – Autos, or China – 
Publications and Audiovisual Products.  
 
It was only in China – Electronic Payments Services that a more detailed analysis of likeness 
was undertaken. The Panel unsuccessfully asked the parties, the U.S. and China, to provide it 
with relevant criteria or an analytical framework to establish likeness—and took the AB’s earlier 
words of caution as to the transposition of trade in goods case law to trade in services into 
deliberation.154 The Panel assessed likeness by looking at the ordinary meaning of the words 
and the context of the phrase ‘like services’. Although in the context of Article XVII GATS, which 
contains more precise wording as to what is less favourable treatment, the Panel concludes that 
‘a likeness determination should be based on arguments and evidence that pertain to the 
competitive relationship of the services being compared.’155 Consecutively, the Panel turned to 
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the likeness of the service suppliers, noting that the analysis of the Panels in EC – Bananas III 
and Canada – Autos on the automatic likeness of services suppliers in case they provide like 
services is to be read as a presumption, and that in the specific circumstances of the case, the 
presumption did not hold.156 Moreover, and interestingly, the Panel held that it is sufficient for 
the complainant to raise a presumption that the services or service suppliers are ‘essentially the 
same in competitive terms’, and that it is up to the respondent to rebut such assertion.157 Both 
for likeness of services and of service suppliers, the actual analysis of competitive relationship 
focused on the perceived competition of the domestic service and service supplier by the 
foreign service supplier, and on the service suppliers’ description of their business scope and 
specific services they provide.158 
 
The latter Panel’s approach in distinguishing between the likeness of services and that of 
service suppliers is of crucial importance for the issue of regulatory autonomy, as it creates 
leeway for governments to distinguish between different service suppliers who supply a like 
service.159 Moreover, it highlights the importance of supplier regulation, which can be taken into 
account when assessing likeness.160 The Panel also solved the question as to whether there 
should be a mutually dependent interpretation of likeness for services and service suppliers,161 
answering in the negative. However, the Panel does not explicitly pronounce whether the 
likeness test for services and that for service suppliers is a cumulative one. It seems possible 
that a like service is supplied by unlike service suppliers, as indicated by this Panel’s 
approach,162 and it can equally be imagined that like service suppliers supply unlike services. 
Henceforth, the question is whether a non-discrimination obligation could be violated if either the 
service or the service supplier is unlike, but they are not both? Although several approaches 
have been presented in the literature,163 future case law will have to clarify this issue. Whatever 
the relationship between likeness of services and of service suppliers, it seems clear that 
sufficient individual attention needs to be given to both—thereby giving deference to regulatory 
autonomy.164 
 
It should be stressed that the current approach to determining likeness in the case of Articles II 
and XVII GATS appears to be one assessing only the competitive relationship between the 
services and service suppliers in a relatively narrow sense. As noted in a leading contribution on 
likeness in GATS, panels nor the AB have had the need to delve into the issue of likeness: in 
the first two cases on likeness the respondents did not dispute the likeness of services and 
service suppliers, and in the latter two cases the assessment of likeness of service suppliers 
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was relatively straight-forward.165 It may thus be argued that it was simply not necessary for the 
panels to assess likeness into more detail, as ‘the issue of ‘likeness’ was not the critical element 
of the analysis.’166 This may be very different in cases of measures which are at face origin-
neutral. 167  Hence, it sufficed for the analysis to focus on a narrow notion of competitive 
relationship. Consider, however, the impact of such an approach on the overall balance of 
regulatory autonomy with trade liberalisation in GATS. If no differentiation as to likeness 
whatsoever can be made outside narrow competitive relationships, than what is the added value 
of assessing the likeness of service suppliers in GATS? The current case law could appear in 
line with the firm rejection of the aim and effects test in the analysis of Articles II and XVII GATS 
by the AB.168 However, as is the case in the GATT case law, the rejection of the aim and effects 
test should not be read as an outright rejection of all other factors than those taken into account 
by the case law up to now. GATT case law on likeness equally focuses on the competitive 
relationship between like products,169 and it should be noted that in this case law, the likeness 
test is more refined. In the case of Article III:4 GATT, a ‘mere economic analysis of the cross-
price elasticity of demand’ is insufficient, and ‘‘likeness’ is a matter of judgement – qualitatively 
as well as quantitatively.’170 The well-known case law on likeness in Article III:4 GATT may be 
summarised as taking into account: 
‘four categories of "characteristics" that the products involved might share: (i) the 
physical properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable 
of serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive 
and treat the products as alternative means of performing particular functions in 
order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification 
of the products for tariff purposes.  
102. These general criteria, or groupings of potentially shared characteristics, 
provide a framework for analyzing the "likeness" of particular products on a case-by-
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case basis. These criteria are, it is well to bear in mind, simply tools to assist in the 
task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence. ’171 
 
In applying these criteria, it should be noted that, although not relevant for the determination of 
likeness, non-product-related processes and production methods (NPR-PPMs) may increasingly 
play a role in consumer tastes and habits, thus influencing likeness.172 
 
However, an application of these criteria to the context of trade in services results in a narrow 
base for the determination of likeness, which may miss out on important factors, therefore 
leading to excessive liberalisation vis-à-vis what is necessary to protect conditions of 
competition between domestic and foreign services and service suppliers.173 Nonetheless, the 
exercise is worth doing as transposing the foregoing to the likeness of services, or more 
importantly, of service suppliers,174 makes several elements stand out. First, it has been argued 
that consumers tastes and habits should play a key role in the establishment of likeness for 
services,175 as the consumer-oriented approach of determining a competitive relationship of 
services and service suppliers requires taking into account many factors besides ‘properties, 
nature and quality’, ‘classification’ or ‘end use’. These include evidence which has been taken 
into account in past case law, such as marketing studies, price differences, distribution 
channels, sales points, statements by national authorities, evidence from third markets and 
health risks.176 Nonetheless, in emphasising consumer tastes and habits, consumers are to bear 
a vast responsibility,177 which is perhaps too heavy a burden. The result of such a burden would 
moreover be that (governmental) information campaigns, whether their basis is correct or not, 
may lead to different consumers’ tastes and habits and thus to different outcomes regarding 
likeness. This issue is much more real in the case of services, considering the vast information 
asymmetries on, for example, the quality of services and service suppliers.178 Hence, it is thus 
true that for now the role of ‘regulatory likeness’ aside ‘competitive likeness’ is limited.179 
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Second, as to the role of NPR-PPMs, it has been argued that it is limited, considering that 
services are often produced and consumed at the same time,180 but also that their role is more 
important, because the likeness of the service supplier requires assessing some process 
methods.181 The issue is crucial for the second dimension of regulatory autonomy, as a  
‘true PPM-measure pursues primarily policy goals unrelated to trade. Most of the 
time, the measure is aimed at subjects such as labour standards, human rights, 
environmental protection or animal welfare.’182 
 
Moreover, in the context of GATS, the issue is more pressing as it entails less extraterritorial 
effects: whilst process and production of a service supplied through Modes 1 and 2 may still be 
foreign, in the case of Modes 3 and 4 they occur on the territory of the importing Member.183 We 
agree with one author who notes that these PPMs should play a role in a sufficiently nuanced 
approach to determining likeness, taking into account likeness of service and service supplier, 
and by thoroughly assessing them on the basis of the competitive relationship criterion.184 
 
Third, although largely an issue in the case of national treatment rather than MFN, the method 
of supply of a service may be a crucial element to consider in the context of ‘properties, nature 
and quality’ of a service, and may influence consumer tastes and habits.185 The method of 
supply and mode of supply should not be confused: the so-called likeness across modes 
should, in fact, be read as likeness across methods of supply, for example face-to-face or 
through the internet.186 The Panel in Canada – Autos stated that for the purposes of the case, 
‘services supplied in Canada through modes 3 and 4 and those supplied from the territory of 
other Members through modes 1 and 2 are "like" services.’187 Moreover, in US – Gambling, this 
matter was elaborately addressed by the parties: Antigua and Barbuda essentially claimed that 
remote gambling services are like land-based gambling services, the U.S. opposed this view.188 
Interestingly, the U.S. pointed out—of course respecting the burden of proof—that Antigua and 
Barbuda did not address how private, non-state service suppliers are like state lottery 
monopolies.189  But these arguments were left unaddressed by the Panel, which exercised 
judicial economy as to Article XVII GATS. Nonetheless, great care should be taken, as the 
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result of accepting likeness across methods of supply may limit real-life regulatory needs.190 
Additionally, the end use of services supplied through different methods of supply may differ, 
and, more generally, there may not be a full competitive relationship.191 
 
Fourth, the classification of services can be examined on the basis of the Service Sectoral 
Classification List,192 compiled by the Secretariat, or the Central Product Classification (CPC) of 
the United Nations (UN), which includes services. 193  We address services classification 
extensively infra. 
 
In conclusion, it suffices to reiterate that, up until now, the likeness test under GATS is still 
underdeveloped, mainly because panels, nor the AB, have yet to decide on a complex likeness 
issue. However, when such a case arises, they must not tread as lightly as they appear to have 
done so far. Several key legal issues remain unsolved, and all of them have important 
repercussions for regulatory autonomy. For now, it seems that the determination of the likeness 
of service suppliers is still largely underdeveloped, and it seems reasonable to foresee an 
application of the Border Tax Adjustments criteria to GATS likeness. The extent to which 
consumers tastes and habits play a role in such an assessment will prove key, as will the 
possibility of including NPR-PPMs. Lastly, the relevance of the method of supply will have to be 
determined with care, especially when this coincides with intermodal supply of services. 
 
3.1.5 The interpretation of ‘less favourable treatment’  
 
As noted, the Panel in EC – Bananas III stated that two conditions need to be fulfilled for there 
to be a violation of the MFN obligation: the services and service suppliers should like, and a 
Member shall not accord less favourable treatment to the services and service suppliers of any 
other Member than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.194 
Crucially, the obligation to accord no less favourable treatment applies to both de jure and de 
facto discrimination: deciding otherwise would made it ‘not difficult’ to ‘devise discriminatory 
measures aimed at circumventing the basic purpose’ of Article II GATS.195 
 
As was the case with likeness, the interpretation of the less favourable treatment standard could 
appear to be relevant for both Articles II and XVII GATS. In that respect, the Panel in EC – 
Bananas noted that the textual differences between the articles—paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 
XVII GATS clarify and reinforce the less favourable treatment standard—do not justify giving a 
different ordinary meaning to the term ‘treatment no less favourable’ in Articles II and XVII 
GATS.196 The AB, however, nuanced this position, stating that interpretations of less favourable 
treatment under Article XVII GATS or Article III GATT are ‘not necessarily relevant to the 
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interpretation’ of the same term in the context of Article II GATS.197 This view can be supported, 
considering the different objectives of an MFN obligation (non-discrimination between services 
or service suppliers of third Members) and a national treatment obligation (non-discrimination 
between domestic and foreign services or service suppliers).198 Nonetheless, in essence, the 
less favourable treatment aspect of the MFN obligation is breached when a measure creates 
less favourable conditions of competition, as does the national treatment obligation.199  
 
As noted, GATS case law interpreted the less favourable treatment criterion as essentially 
assessing whether the measure modifies the conditions of competition. Notably, in the EC – 
Bananas III case, the Panel and the AB considered there to be less favourable treatment for 
one category of foreign service suppliers (Category A) in comparison to another category 
(Category B), on the basis that service suppliers from the complainants’ origin usually are 
Category A service suppliers for the vast majority of the marketing of their bananas, whilst 
Category B service suppliers have a greater opportunity to benefit from tariff quota rents, are 
eligible for a relatively large number of import licenses, are exempted from matching import 
licenses with export certificates, and are eligible for hurricane licenses.200 It should, however, be 
noted that the EU, at the introduction of licensing system which was under scrutiny, had stated 
that its purpose was cross-subsidisation of Category B service suppliers.201  
 
In Canada – Autos, the GATS consistency of a similar measure, granting import duty 
exemptions to a closed category of service suppliers, was under scrutiny.202 In this case, the AB 
did not uphold the Panel’s finding that less favourable treatment was accorded to like service 
suppliers of some Members, considering that the Panel did not analyse the effect of the import 
tax exemption for manufacturers on those manufacturers in their capacity as wholesale service 
suppliers.203 Interestingly, the Panel noted that potential competition suffices to establish less 
favourable treatment. 204  Although the AB criticised the Panel’s approach for a lack of 
examination, stating that the Panel made assumptions not based on factual evidence, and 
reversed these findings,205 in EC – Bananas, a similar finding was made regarding Article XVII 
GATS.206 Of course, this also means that potential service suppliers, even lacking capacity or 
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ability to supply like services, can be like service suppliers to those who actually supply the 
service.207 Nonetheless, the AB appears to have narrowed the scope of including potential 
service suppliers by explicitly referring to vertically integrated companies, which in the facts of 
the EC – Bananas case, are existing incumbents in the relevant market.208 Similarly, in Canada 
– Autos,209 the AB seems to have limited the scope of a finding of de facto discrimination ‘as far 
as it is allegedly caused by measures directly regulating trade in goods, and, if at all, only 
implicitly affecting trade in services.210 Still, these findings could have important repercussions 
for regulatory autonomy, considering that if potential service suppliers have a right to non-
discriminatory treatment, the scope of the obligations as concerns regulations dealing with 
investment could extend considerably—even if such regulations do not directly or predominantly 
deal with services.211 
 
As noted, the AB held that the aim and effects of the measure should not be taken into account. 
The AB also explicitly confirmed this as regards assessing whether a measure modifies the 
conditions of competition. 212  In the context of this test, it should be stressed that a strict 
denunciation of taking into account legitimate policies may ‘undermine sovereign regulatory 
powers’ to a larger degree than is the case for trade in goods, considering that service suppliers 
are affected by a much larger range of regulations.213 However, aside from the rejected aim and 
effect test, other possibilities of taking into account legitimate policies may arise. Indeed, when 
assessing whether treatment is less favourable, the purpose of a regulation might allow 
distinguishing between like services or service suppliers if this distinction has an objective basis 
or a legitimate regulatory purpose.214 Such a claim is based on the AB’s statement that the 
design and structure of a measure may indicate a protectionist intent and the causing of less 
favourable treatment.215 However, this reasoning was based on Article III:1 GATT, of which no 
equivalent exists under the GATS. Nonetheless, in EC – Asbestos, the AB held that 
‘a Member may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be 
"like", without, for this reason alone, according to the group of "like" imported  
products "less favourable treatment" than that accorded to the group of "like" 
domestic  products.’216 
 
In a subsequent case, the AB also stated that 
‘However, the existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting 
from a measure does not necessarily imply that this measure accords less 
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favourable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or 
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the market 
share of the importer in this case.’217 
 
Although the AB does not explicitly use non-economic factors or circumstances, it does not 
close the door in taking such factors or circumstances into account. The Panel in EC – Biotech, 
a report which was not appealed, held that  
‘it is not self-evident that the alleged less favourable treatment of imported biotech 
products is explained by the foreign origin of these products rather than, for 
instance, a perceived difference between biotech products and non-biotech products 
in terms of their safety, etc.’218 
 
In this case, the Panel argued that although the complainant did not argue that the less 
favourable treatment arose from the origin of the product, the complainant should have brought 
forth evidence in that respect, thereby showing that the less favourable treatment is not 
explained by ‘safety, etc.’219 Unsurprisingly, the taking into account of regulatory purpose in the 
less favourable treatment test has been the subject of much debate.220 In any case, it seems 
that ‘elements having to do with the ‘aims and effects’ doctrine’ are reappearing in the 
assessment of non-discrimination obligations, and considering the broad scope of such 
obligations in the case of services, may be expected to play a role in the arguments of 
respondents in future case law.221 
 
3.1.6 Exceptions to the Most-Favoured-Nation treatment obligation 
 
Aside from establishing the obligation, Article II GATS also contains exceptions to the MFN 
obligation. First, paragraph 2 contains the legal basis for Members’ lists of MFN Exemptions. 
Second, paragraph 3 exempts Members from extending more favourable treatment to all other 
Members if such treatment is accorded to facilitate an exchange of services that are locally 
produced and consumed in the case of frontier zones. 
 
                                               
217
 Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes WT/DS302/AB/R, AB 
report adopted 19 May 2005 para. 96. 
218
 European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products WT/DS293/R, 
Panel report adopted 21 November 2006 para. 7.2514. 
219
 Diebold 82-83. 
220
 See, for example, Hudec; Ehring; Donald H Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose and “Like Products” in Article III:4 of the 
GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article III:2)’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 443; Porges and Trachtman; Eric 
Leroux, ‘Eleven Years of GATS Case Law: What Have We Learned?’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic 
Law 749, 777-785; Nicolas Diebold, ‘Standards of Nondiscrimination in International Economic Law’ (2011) 60 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 831; Flett. 
221
 Leroux 782. 
44 
 
As concerns the first exception, over 90 Members listed almost 500 measures in their lists of 
MFN Exemptions.222 They had to be listed at the time of conclusion of GATS in the Annex on 
Article II Exemptions. Acceding Members can equally adopt a list of MFN Exemptions. 223 
Although the exemptions only apply to measures that existed at the entry into force of the 
agreement, in practice, some future exemptions ‘were presented as existing ones’.224 Paragraph 
6 of the Annex on Article II Exemptions clarifies that, in principle, the exemptions were to extinct 
after maximum ten years. In reality, many exemptions seem to have been scheduled 
indefinitely.225 Legally speaking, this of course raises questions of the WTO compatibility of such 
indefinite exemptions. Obviously, considering that a large majority of exemptions are scheduled 
indefinitely, there is little risk that a case may be brought—a similar story to the WTO 
compatibility of RTAs, to which we come back in the following chapter—but if the economic 
relevance of a specific MFN exemption were sufficiently large, it is not unthinkable that a 
Member with itself, perhaps none or relatively unimportant MFN exemptions, would bring up 
such an argument.  
 
It should equally be noted that just over half of all MFN exemptions apply to audio-visual 
services and maritime, air and road transport services—sectors in which few GATS 
commitments have been made, and about one fifth of all exemptions apply to all sectors.226  
Exemptions are mostly listed because of reciprocity—i.e. they are ‘needed to achieve equal 
access or treatment in foreign markets’ or ‘necessary to respond to unfair practices abroad’—or 
as a result of preferential treatment accorded to other Members as a result of bi- or plurilateral 
agreements.227 Notably, MFN exemptions can both allow more favourable treatment or ‘targeted 
denials’ of less favourable treatment.228 
 
In the case of the EU, the list of MFN Exemptions contains eight exemptions related to audio-
visual services (which highlights this sector’s sensitive nature) and three exemptions related to 
publishing on a total of nineteen sector-specific exemptions. The other sectors for which an 
exemption was listed are road transport and internal waterways transport (two listings each); 
computerised reservation systems and air transport sales and marketing services; rental and 
leasing of ships; and direct non-life insurance and financial services. Not all exemptions apply to 
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all EU Member States, as some Member States such as France and Italy have negotiated 
specific exemptions. Likewise, not all exemptions address all third countries. In some cases, the 
beneficiary third countries for which the exemption applies are listed. For instance, an indefinite 
MFN exemption is listed for the production and distribution of cinematographic works and 
television programmes in Nordic countries. This exempts Denmark from an obligation to extend 
the treatment accorded to Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland—note that these beneficiaries 
are both EU and non-EU Member States—regarding benefits provided in conformity with 
support programmes that enhance the production and distribution of audio-visual works 
produced in Nordic countries to third countries. The rationale for the exemption is the 
preservation and promotion of the regional identity. 229  Furthermore, the EU list of MFN 
Exemptions contains nine horizontal exemptions. Only three of these exemptions apply to all EU 
Member States. These exemptions address the progressive liberalisation between the EU and 
Switzerland, San Marino, Monaco, Andorra, and Vatican City State and work permits for 
seasonal workers from states in Central Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and in the 
Mediterranean Basin. 
 
Regarding the second exception, the frontier zone exception of Article II:3 GATS, it should be 
noted that the exemption only applies to adjacent countries. It states that the MFN obligation 
shall not prevent a Member from conferring advantages to services that are both locally 
produced and consumed in order to facilitate exchanges limited to contiguous frontier zones. 
The exception has never been addressed in WTO dispute settlement and can be considered of 
minor importance. Moreover, its relevance for regulatory autonomy seems non-existent. 
 
3.1.7 The impact on regulatory autonomy 
 
As noted supra, it could be said that, in general, the MFN obligation is of little concern to 
regulatory autonomy.230 Nonetheless, such a statement should be nuanced, as highlighted by 
the above analysis. First, regulators should be aware of the implications of an MFN obligation in 
a sweeping agreement such as GATS. Second, the specific issue of the MFN-consistency of 
BITs should be considered. Although perhaps less relevant politically, the legal reality of this 
analysis appears quite clear: benefits awarded to investors which fall within the scope of GATS 
should be extended on an MFN basis to investors from all other Members. Third and fourth, the 
still incomplete interpretation of likeness has not taken into account the specificity of the 
likeness of service suppliers, although this is a key difference with likeness under GATT. It 
remains to be seen how future cases will address this crucial legal test. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of less favourable treatment in the context of Article II GATS is still in its infancy. 
Considering the specificity of MFN in GATS, we are very careful to draw preliminary conclusions 
as to how a modification of the conditions of competition should be interpreted in the case of a 
wide and unconditional non-discrimination provision such as Article II GATS. Nonetheless, it 
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should be stressed that there may be few practical situations in which some foreign services 
and services suppliers are accorded less favourable treatment in comparison to other foreign 
services and service suppliers. Fifth, we examined the exceptions to the obligation, which are 
static and specific. 
 
3.2 Unconditional transparency obligations 
 
3.2.1 The principle of transparency in WTO and GATS 
 
The GATS preamble holds that it was established ‘with a view to the expansion of such [i.e. 
trade in services] trade under conditions of transparency’. This led a Panel to conclude that the 
‘requirement of transparency is undoubtedly an object and purpose of the GATS—and the WTO 
in general’. 231  This finding was—although not explicitly—confirmed by the AB. 232  However, 
perhaps mainly due to judicial economy concerns, there is little interpretational help from WTO 
dispute settlement organs regarding these provisions. 233  Nonetheless, transparency in the 
internal legal regimes of Members is key to facilitating trade: it reduces transaction and 
information costs and improves efficiency. Moreover, it increases legal certainty and 
predictability. In the best case, transparency may even lead to better regulations, greater 
compliance and increased legitimacy.234 It can therefore be considered a cornerstone of WTO 
law.235  
 
In the WTO agreements, the principle of transparency is three-pronged: it contains requirements 
(i) to make information on trade related laws, regulations and policies publicly available; (ii) to 
notify (changes to) laws and regulations; and (iii) to ensure that laws and regulations are 
administered in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner. 236  The WTO Secretariat 
summarises the transparency principle in WTO law as follows: 
‘transparency is a requirement to provide sufficient information so that other 
Members can determine whether or not obligations are in fact being met. It is also a 
requirement that the administration of rules be reasonable and non-
discriminatory.’237 
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This translates into the fact that, from a transparency point of view (and with the effects on trade 
of both measures being equal), it is preferable to be overtly protectionist—whether by 
discriminating or reducing market access—than to use less transparent regulatory instruments 
which are covertly protectionist.238 In the area of ‘essentially internal governmental regulation 
that have as their principal objects the promotion of legitimate public policy objectives’, it is 
crucial to find a balance between acceptable transparency requirements in policy fields which 
are not directly related to trade, but can have an important impact on it and ensuring that such 
regulation in these policy fields is not a disguised restriction to trade.239 At first sight, it may 
hardly be said that the mere fulfilling even very burdensome transparency requirements of the 
transparency principle constrains regulatory autonomy. The in some cases possibly excessive 
burden of transparency requirements may be worth a debate on its own merits, considering that 
‘the way rules are applied can be as significant as the substance of the rules themselves’.240 
However, the transparency principle is an expression of an openness and fairness which is 
likely to be inherent to many Members, such as the EU and its Member States. This does not 
mean that the requirements can’t raise any issues, but they do not appear related to regulatory 
autonomy.241 Nonetheless, to confirm this statement, we individually assess GATS obligations 
related to transparency. 
 
Applying the three pronged approach to GATS—(i) public availability of information; (ii) 
notification of relevant laws; (iii) uniform, impartial and reasonable administration—it should be 
noted that the three shapes of the transparency principle are not found in a single provision but 
across various provisions of the agreement.242 In the following paragraphs, we address these 
obligations in the order in which they arise in GATS. 
 
Before delving into the analysis, it should be noted that our analysis regarding the limited impact 
on regulatory autonomy may, however, not hold true under a wider conception of the principle of 
transparency. It has been argued that, in contrast to the procedural transparency requirements 
of the three-pronged approach, the principle of transparency may also include regulatory 
transparency as addressed by Article VI:4 GATS.243 Such a notion of transparency imports 
issues of disguised protectionist intent into the debate. However, these issues are distinct from 
those at hand here and we will henceforth adhere to the Secretariat’s more narrow definition of 
transparency. 
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3.2.2 The obligation to publish or make publicly available all relevant measures 
 
First, Article III:1-2 GATS requires Members to publish or make otherwise publicly available all 
relevant measures of general application and which pertain to or affect the operation of 
GATS.244 This must be done promptly or at the latest by the time of their entry into force.245 
However, publication can occur after the entry into force of the measure in case of emergency 
situations. The obligation includes international agreements to which the Member is a party. It 
should be recalled that, according to Article XXVIII (a) GATS, ‘measure’ means ‘any measure by 
a Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative 
action, or any other form’. The condition of general applicability implies that these transparency 
obligations apply to legislative, administrative and judicial decisions if they apply not solely 
between parties.246 However, individual decisions which establish or abandon a principle of 
general application, or which establish or modify conditions or terms which are also applicable 
to future cases, also fall within the scope of the provision.247 Moreover, this obligation might also 
apply to measures regulating other sectors, such as goods, if the relevant measures affect 
GATS.248 It is up to the complainant to prove that a measure of general application has not been 
published or made public otherwise.249 The emergency exception, allowing publication of a 
measure after the entry into force, would only apply to a situation which is both unexpected and 
unforeseeable and which prevents a Member from publishing the measure.250 
 
In the case of the EU, all legislation (regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and 
opinions) and references to international agreements and conventions signed by the EU, are 
published in the L series of the Official Journal of the European Union. The C series of the 
Official Journal contains inter alia summaries of the judgments of the European Court of Justice 
and the General Court, which can also be accessed in their entirety online through either the 
Curia or EUR-Lex websites. In the case of EU Member States, it is likely that national laws 
impose similar requirements.251 It would thus seem unlikely that these obligations even impose 
an obligation on the EU or its Member States, let alone constrain regulatory autonomy in any 
way. Nonetheless, in EC – IT Products, a GATT case dealing with a similar requirement to 
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promptly publish such measures, the Panel decided that the EU’s publication in the Official 
Journal eight months after the relevant measure was made effective, was not prompt. 252 
Equally, the Panel found that the publication of the measure on the EU’s Comitology website 
was prompt, but did not satisfy Article X:1 GATT’s second condition, i.e. that publication was not 
in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with the 
measure.253 
 
3.2.3 The obligations to respond to information requests and establish enquiry points 
Second, Article III:4 GATS obliges Members to respond promptly to all requests by other 
Members for specific information on the relevant measures of general application which pertain 
to or affect the operation of GATS. Moreover, each Member was obliged to establish within two 
years of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, i.e. by 1 January 1997, one or more 
enquiry points to provide specific information upon request by other Members. These enquiry 
points do not need to be depositories of laws and regulations. The Council for Trade in Services 
(CTS), the WTO body under guidance of the General Council which is responsible for 
overseeing the functioning of GATS, decided that Members are to notify the establishment of 
the enquiry points to it, which both the EU and its 28 Member States have done after 
establishing the enquiry points.254 
 
3.2.4 The obligation to establish contact points 
Third, Article IV:2 GATS requires developed Members and to the extent possible other 
Members to establish contact points before 1 January 1997. These contact points aim to 
facilitate access for developing countries’ service suppliers to information on commercial and 
technical aspects of the supply of services, registration, recognition and obtaining of 
professional qualifications and the availability of services technology. The information should 
conform to certain minimum standards, such as being easily accessible, accurate, complete and 
up to date.255 As is the case for enquiry points, Members are to notify the establishment of 
contact points. Although the EU and most Member States have established a contact point, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Romania have not.256 Still, the obligation to establish 
contact points cannot be said to constrain regulatory autonomy in any way. 
 
3.2.5 The obligation to notify integration agreements 
Fourth, GATS contains notification requirements related to two types of permissible integration 
agreements. Although, in essence, they violate the MFN treatment obligation, regional 
economic integration agreements and labour market integration agreements are allowed by 
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GATS if they fulfil certain conditions, to which we come back infra. In the context of 
transparency requirements, however, it should be remarked that such integration agreements 
are, in accordance with Articles V:7 (a) and (b), and V bis (b) GATS to be notified to the CTS. 
As concerns regional integration agreements, Members shall promptly notify an agreement or 
the enlargement or significant modification of an agreement, and make available any relevant 
information requested by the CTS. If the agreement is being implemented on the basis of a 
timeframe, a Member must report periodically. Although the required information to be 
submitted is quite elaborate,257 this obligation should not give rise to difficulties considering that 
notification is only necessary after ratification but before application.258 In practice, the EU has 
notified its recent RTAs including services provisions at a date very close to its entry into force, 
and in the case of the EU-Korea RTA, slightly after.259 In the case of labour market integration 
agreements, GATS only requires notification to the CTS.260 Again, it cannot be said that these 
notification requirements constrain regulatory autonomy. 
 
3.2.6 The obligation to make available legal remedies 
Fifth, and although the core paragraphs of Article VI GATS deal with domestic regulation, of 
which Members seem to agree that the disciplines should only apply to sectors in which 
commitments have been scheduled, 261  the second paragraph of this provision is an 
unconditional obligation concerning the availability of legal remedies. In that sense, it belongs 
under the third prong of transparency. Subparagraph (a) requires Members to maintain or 
institute as soon as practicable judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures which 
provide, at the request of an affected service supplier, for the prompt review of, and where 
justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in services. The term 
‘administrative decision’ likely refers to a legally binding act which regulates an individual 
situation, usually by applying a generally applicable measure to a particular case.262 Moreover, it 
is clarified that where such procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted with the 
administrative decision concerned, the Member shall ensure that the procedures in fact provide 
for an objective and impartial review. Nonetheless, Members have considerable leeway when 
regulating the review. For example, this can be done by requiring the affected service supplier 
to show he is affected and to identify the grounds on which he will challenge the administrative 
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decision or by choosing appropriate remedies.263 The Appellate Body held that Article VI:2 (a) 
GATS is part of a broader principle, as a requirement to provide independent review is also 
found in, for example, the GATT, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.264 Subparagraph (b) limits the obligation of subparagraph (a): 
the latter shall not be construed to require a Member to institute such tribunals or procedures 
where this would be inconsistent with its constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system.  
 
In the case of Members who already comply with this obligation as a result of national law, the 
provision will have little impact. However, in Members where no such procedures are in place, 
quite far-reaching adaptations could possibly be required to conform with Article VI:2 GATS. 
Nonetheless, considering that other trade agreements contain similar or more stringent 
provisions, it might be argued that these provisions are a prerequisite to enter into the 
multilateral trading system. The obligations have been said to be deemed ‘part of a proper 
regulatory framework ensuring transparency and accountability in modern democratic 
societies.’265 In the case of the EU, such framework should exist and henceforth, the impact of 
these provisions on domestic regulatory autonomy thus appears very limited.266  
 
However, it should be mentioned that although such a framework should exist in the EU, it may 
not always be the case in practice. In a case brought against the EU on the basis of Article X:3 
(b) GATT, which contains an obligation similar to Article VI:2 GATS,267 the U.S. claimed that 
because decisions or procedures for the review and correction of administrative action on 
customs issues are regulated on the level of EU Member States and henceforth they are only 
binding within that Member State, the EU violated its obligation to maintain, or institute as soon 
as practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures. According to the U.S., 
Article X:3 (b) GATT requires that decisions of the judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals, or 
procedures for the review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters 
must govern the practice of all the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement 
throughout the territory of a particular WTO Member.268 The Panel and the AB in EC – Selected 
Customs Matters did not agree, holding that there is nothing in text, context or object and 
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purpose of Article X:3 (b) GATT which requires such first instance review to govern the practice 
of all agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement throughout the territory of a particular 
WTO Member.269 In any case, this dispute illustrates that there is scope for debate in specific 
circumstances. Nonetheless, the influence on regulatory autonomy is likely to remain very 
limited. 
 
3.2.7 Transparency obligations related to recognition 
 
Sixth, Article VII:4 GATS contains transparency requirements related to autonomous and mutual 
recognition. 270  Although the agreement does not contain a definition of recognition, it can 
generally be defined as ‘the acceptance of regulatory conditions for goods and services required 
in one country (exporting origin/home country) as equivalent in another country (importing 
country/host country).’271 In this regard, Article VII:4 GATS includes three linked transparency 
obligations for Members. First, a Member must, within one year after the WTO Agreement takes 
effect for the Member, inform the CTS of its existing recognition measures. Additionally, the 
notifying Member must state whether such measures are based on recognition agreements or 
arrangements relating to the standards or criteria for the authorisation, licensing or certification 
of services suppliers which recognise the education or experience obtained, requirements met, 
or licenses or certifications granted in a particular country. Second, a Member must promptly 
inform the CTS as far in advance as possible of the opening of negotiations on such an 
agreement or arrangement. This obligation was added in order to allow any other Member to 
indicate an interest in participating in the negotiations before they enter a substantive phase. 
Third, a Member must promptly inform the CTS when it adopts new recognition measures or 
significantly modifies existing ones and state whether the measures are based on an agreement 
or arrangement of the type referred to. All three types of notification should contain a summary 
of the main elements of the measure and where additional information can be found, for 
example via the enquiry points or the WTO Secretariat.272  
 
The rationale behind these obligations is found in the trade diverting or even restricting effects 
of recognition vis-à-vis non-beneficiary Members.273 However, there have been few notifications: 
between January 1995 and July 2006, there were 44 notifications, covering about 120 
agreements or measures, about two thirds of which predate GATS.274 Reasons for these low 
numbers may include that the competent national bodies are unaware of the obligation or that 
Members are under the incorrect impression that regional economic integration agreements, 
such as RTAs, which include recognition provisions are only to be notified under Article V 
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GATS.275 Nonetheless, as concerns the transparency obligations of this provision, there do not 
appear to be constraints on regulatory autonomy. 
 
3.2.8 The obligation to enter into consultations regarding business practices 
 
Seventh, Article IX:2 GATS obliges Members to enter into consultations at the request of any 
other Member, with a view to eliminate certain business practices of service suppliers which 
may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in services, other than those addressed by 
Article VIII GATS on monopolies and exclusive service providers. The Member which is being 
requested shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to such a request and cooperate 
through the supply of publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to the matter in 
question. Article IX GATS is considered a ‘soft consultation norm’,276 and we see no constraints 
on regulatory autonomy stemming from it. 
 
3.2.9 The impact of unconditional transparency obligations on regulatory autonomy 
 
Transparency obligations are an important part of GATS rules as they aim to hinder the 
enactment of protectionist measures or allow other Members and their economic actors to be 
aware of such measures. Even more, there appears to be a direct correlation between 
transparency and regulatory autonomy: transparency requirements are more important, and 
tend to be more detailed, in areas of WTO law where there is more regulatory autonomy.277 
However, as becomes clear from the foregoing overview, unconditional transparency obligations 
appear to pose very few constraints on regulatory autonomy in the case of the EU.  
 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION 
 
This report consists of two main parts. In the first part, we provided an overview and 
conceptualisation of regulatory autonomy in international trade law. The five dimensions of 
regulatory autonomy bring together points of view taken throughout the literature in one 
comprehensive model. A more detailed understanding of the concept allows us to better 
address how regulatory autonomy is constrained by the obligations and commitments in GATS 
undertaken by the EU. The analysis highlights that it is of crucial importance to properly define 
one’s view on regulatory autonomy in a specific context, considering the many possible 
interpretations of the term. Moreover, it is clear that regulatory autonomy is in constant flux and 
is influenced from several angles and by multiple actors and actions. Nonetheless, in the 
context of this research track, it becomes clear how we will assess constraints on regulatory 
autonomy as exogenous constraints on all types of measures, whatever the aim they pursue, by 
analysing how a trade law violation is established as a result of obligations—whatever their 
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nature— and the interpretation thereof. Subsequently, we briefly addressed the inherent tension 
between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation, and explained why an analysis of this 
tension in the case of services requires a case study. Moreover, we highlighted that the EU is a 
perfect candidate for the case study for several reasons. 
 
In the second part of this report, we addressed regulatory autonomy concerns of a first category 
of obligations arising from GATS, the unconditional obligations. In the case of the MFN 
obligation, there are concerns regarding the compatibility of BITs with Article II GATS. 
Additionally, the limited case law on likeness requires attention, especially concerning the 
likeness of service suppliers. Concerning less favourable treatment, it should be stressed that 
there are still many unknowns. The interpretation of less favourable treatment in the context of 
Article XVII GATS may shed some light onto the issue, but care should be taken considering the 
AB’s statement on transposing the differently worded less favourable treatment standard from 
national treatment to MFN. As concerns the obligations related to transparency, we see very 
few constraints on regulatory autonomy, although care has to be taken in the case of some 
potential ‘holes’ in the existing transparency regime of the EU.  
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